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1 Introduction
The relation of Isaac Newton’s natural philosophy to his method of inquiry is of central
importance to Newtonian scholarship. In this paper, we investigate this relation as it
concerns Newton’s ideas about the nature and measure of matter. We argue that a conflict
between two conceptions of “quantity of matter” employed in a corollary to proposition 6 of
Book III of the Principia illustrates a deeper conflict between Newton’s view of the nature
of extended bodies and the concept of mass appropriate for the theoretical framework of the
Principia. The conflict was first noted by the editor of the Principia’s second edition, Roger
Cotes, and put to Newton by what we call the “two globes” objection. The objection makes
it clear that two different measures of “quantity of matter” are at work in Newton’s thinking,
measures that are related to two competing views on the nature of matter. On what we
call the “dynamical conception of matter”—the dominant conception in the Principia—
quantity of matter is measured through a body’s response to impressed force. On what we
call the “geometrical conception of matter,” quantity of matter is measured by the volume a
body impenetrably fills. Newton’s commitment to the geometrical conception comes out in
his discussion with Cotes through the assumption that all atoms of matter have a uniform
∗Many thanks to J. E. McGuire, who years ago recommended that we combine apparently two unrelated
papers into a single piece. Along with B. R. Goldstein, he was our first guide to the Newtonian universe
and his insight is directly responsible for this work. Additional thanks to others who provided us with
comments and discussion: Katherine Brading, Tyler Burge, John Carriero, William Harper, Andrew Janiak,
Eric Schliesser, George Smith, Sheldon Smith, Howard Stein, Wouter Valentin and the participants of the
“Newton and/as Philosophy” conference. Our treatment of Newton’s method of inquiry is particularly
indebted to the published and unpublished works of Howard Stein.
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specific gravity; that is, that the inertia of completely filled bodies is proportional to their
volume. On the dynamical conception of matter, there is no reason for this to be the case.
A purely dynamical conception is consistent with the idea that the inertia of completely
filled bodies is not in fixed proportion to their volumes, or even that a Boscovichian non-
extended point particle can constitute a body. By analyzing the exchange with Cotes (as
well as evidence from De gravitatione), we show that before Cotes’ prodding in 1712, Newton
held both conceptions of matter and apparently saw no conflict between them.
We trace Newton’s failure to recognize the conflict between the dynamical and geomet-
rical conceptions of matter to the fact that Newton allowed for the justification of natural
philosophical claims by two types of a posteriori, empiricist methodologies, both of which
turn away from the type of a priori speculation Newton found deplorable in Descartes. Al-
though both proceed “from the phenomena,” we argue that there are important differences
between them. The first, which underlies the dynamical conception, is highly mathematical
and relies on a nuanced interplay between specific phenomena and their theoretical descrip-
tion. Recent work by George Smith, Bill Harper, and Howard Stein (following the original
characterization of the “Newtonian Style” by I.B. Cohen) has shown how this methodology
was used in the Principia to justify the theoretical framework provided by the laws of mo-
tion. Drawing on their analyses, we briefly characterize this method, using Newton’s reply
to Cotes’ better-known “invisible hand” objection as an illustration. The second empiricist
method, which underlies the geometrical conception, also proceeds from the phenomena,
but does not draw on the technical resources used in the first. Instead, its conclusions
are intended to follow from general features of our experience (in conjunction with broad
natural philosophical assumptions), in a way articulated most clearly in De gravitatione
and through certain of Newton’s examples in Rule III of the Regulae philosophandi. We
argue that although both methods of inquiry are based on empirical considerations, the
relationship of theory to evidence in each is different. Of course, centuries of debate attest
to the difficulty in extracting from Newton’s explicit methodological discussions a clear ac-
count of evidential warrant that fits the entirety of Newton’s practice. We do not tackle
this general question here. Instead, we merely highlight two different types of arguments
from the phenomena endorsed by Newton and argue that he failed to clearly distinguish
them. Consequently, he failed to recognize that one was not as secure as the other. In the
Principia and De gravitatione, the two conceptions of matter are justified by these different
types of arguments, yet prior to Cotes’ “two globes” objection, Newton treated the two
conceptions as if on equal footing, without recognizing their different sources of evidential
warrant. Cotes’ objection forced Newton to reconsider the status of the geometrical con-
ception. Although he never drew general conclusions regarding the relation between his
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two methods of inquiry, he came to side with the method of inquiry that more elaborately
tied empirical data to theoretical claims and, in the body of proposition III.6, framed the
geometrical conception of matter only hypothetically. Given the deep-seated Cartesian and
atomistic roots of the geometrical conception in Newton’s thought, this was a profound
shift.
We begin (in §2) by introducing the geometrical and dynamical conceptions of matter
and the measures of quantity of matter associated with each. To do so, we review the
empirical reasons that led Newton to abandon aether theories of gravitation and accept the
existence of void spaces. Although the acceptance of void forced Newton to reject much of
the Cartesian analysis of space and body, we show that the geometrical conception of matter
present in De gravitatione (hereafter, De grav) and later work shows a lingering debt to
Descartes, particularly in its geometrical method of quantifying matter. At the close of §2
we explicate the a posteriori method of inquiry that, for Newton, underlies the geometrical
method of quantifying matter. In §3 turn to the a posteriori method that underlies the
dynamical conception of matter. Drawing on these accounts of the contrasting methods,
we then investigate the conflict between the two conceptions of matter in §4.
2 Newton’s Conceptions of Matter
2.1 The Context: Newton’s Empirical Case Against The Aether
In the years leading up to the Principia, Newton’s natural philosophy underwent a “radical
conversion” (to borrow R. S. Westfall’s phrase); he abandoned the fundamental ideas of
Cartesian natural philosophy and put in their place novel conceptions of space, body, and
motion. This radical conversion was motivated in large part by Newton’s rejection of the
idea that the planets must be carried in their orbits by an aetherial vortex composed of
subtle matter. In this section, we will focus on two crucial empirical reasons that led Newton
to abandon the aetherial explanation of planetary motion and clarify how his a posteriori
line of reasoning undermined the principles of Cartesian philosophy.
As early as 1664, Newton took the cause of terrestrial gravitation to be mechanical and
formulated a mechanical aether theory akin to other contemporary theories. The central
idea of these theories—that a body’s weight could be explained in terms of a descending
stream of aetherial fluid exerting pressure on the inner surfaces of a body—appears to have
persisted in Newton’s various versions of an aether hypothesis for gravity through the 1670s,
even as the gravitational aether became more intricately tied to active principles inspired
by his alchemical studies.1
1In response to Hooke’s claim of priority in discovering the inverse square law, Newton referred Halley to
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The central role played by the gravitational aether in the 1670s makes its nearly complete
(if temporary) disappearance from Newton’s natural philosophy in the period preceding the
composition of the Principia quite remarkable.2 In the first edition of the Principia Newton
gave two decisive empirical reasons for abandoning the aether. First, he became convinced
that the planets and comets encounter negligible resistance to their motion. In first two
theorems of the De motu corporum in gyrum, Newton derived Kepler’s area law and the har-
monic law for a central force with no resistance. The accuracy of Kepler’s laws in describing
planetary motions implied that there was no need to introduce a resisting force alongside
the centripetal force holding the planets in their orbits.3 Newton strengthened his case in
later drafts and in the Principia. The persistence of planetary motion over thousands of
years is incompatible with even very slight aetherial resistance (Herivel 1965, p. 302), since
even slight resistance would lead to a steady decrease in quantity of motion. The motion
of comets can also be ascribed to the same centripetal force as planetary motions, again
without the need for a further force of resistance. But the motion of comets is particularly
important because of their highly eccentric orbits and the existence of retrograde comets.4
The negligible resistance encountered by the planets is compatible with an aetherial vortex
in which the planets move with the aether, but it is much more difficult to reconcile the
motion of comets, especially retrograde ones, with a vortex theory. Newton developed De
motu’s argument that the celestial bodies move in non-resisting spaces into a more sustained
attack on vortex theories in the Principia.
Second, Newton failed to detect aether resistance in a series of carefully designed pen-
dulum experiments reported in Book II of the Principia. Based on the realization that a
gravitational aether must penetrate to the inner surfaces of bodies—without such penetra-
a manuscript from 1675 (“Hypothesis Explaining the Properties of Light,” sent to Oldenburg) that included
an aether hypothesis which Newton claimed led naturally to an inverse square law (Newton (1977) II, p.
447; the manuscript sent to Oldenburg is reproduced in Newton (1977) I, pp. 364-6). Regardless of whether
any of the various aether hypotheses lead to such quantitative results, from the mid 1660s onward they were
a constant fixture in Newton’s thoughts on gravitation. See “Of gravity and levity,” in McGuire and Tamny
(1983), pp. 362-5, 426-31, and Wilson (1976), pp. 192-5, regarding Newton’s early views. Regarding the
development of Newton’s thought throughout the 1670s, and the many roles the aether played in Newton’s
natural philosophy, see Dobbs (1991), Chapter 4.
2See Dobbs (1988) for a detailed discussion of Newton’s abandonment of the gravitational aether. For
a review of the shifts in Newton’s views regarding aether and void following the Principia’s first edition
see McGuire (1966), pp. 103-110 et passim. Although Newton later considered an immaterial gravitational
aether, he frequently repeated the two reasons discussed below for abandoning the hypothesis of a material
aether.
3As Newton was well aware, even if there is no resistance Kepler’s laws fail to hold exactly for universal
gravity due to the perturbing effects of each planet on the other planets’ orbits (Herivel 1965, p. 301).
However, the departures from Keplerian motion due to these perturbations differ in character from the
departures Newton expected for a resisting medium.
4Retrograde comets, such as Halley’s comet, orbit the sun in the opposite direction to that of the planets.
Newton also argued that the tails of comets show no sign of encountering resistance to a surrounding medium.
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tion, the aether’s action could only depend on a body’s surface area, not its “solidity” or
bulk—Newton designed experiments to measure the internal resistance due to the aether.5
Newton constructed a pendulum consisting of a “round firwood box” suspended from a
cord eleven feet long. He measured the oscillations of the empty box, and then filled the
box with various heavy metals, adjusting the cord to the same length. The metal-filled box
weighed 78 times as much as the empty, and so in the absence of internal resistance New-
ton believed the oscillations of the full pendulum bob (due to the bob’s increased inertia)
would take 78 times as long to decay. Newton initially assumed that filling the box would
not change its external resistance. From the result that the decay only took 77 times as
long, Newton concluded that the internal resistance must be over 5,000 times less than the
external resistance. In the second and third edition of the Principia, Newton interpreted
this to mean that aether resistance caused the damping. He wrote:
This argument depends on the hypothesis that the greater resistance encoun-
tered by the full box does not arise from some other hidden cause but only from
the action of some subtle fluid upon the enclosed metal (Newton 1999, p. 723).
However, in the first edition of the Principia (in a passage omitted in the second and third
editions), Newton proposed a different cause: He wrote:
But I suppose that the cause is very different [than the aether acting on the
internal surfaces of the box]. For the times of the oscillation of the full box are
less than those of the empty one, and therefore the resistance to the external
surface of the full box is greater, by virtue of its velocity and the length of its os-
cillations, than to the empty box. From which it follows that the resistance [due]
to the internal parts of the box is either zero or entirely insensible (translated
in Kuhn 1970, pp. 106-7).
Newton’s conclusion is phrased cautiously. He did not claim to settle the question of the
aether’s existence; instead, he inferred only that if there is an aether, then its resistance is
either nil or negligible. However, he had also concluded on the basis of other experiments
(reported in the same scholium) that the primary contribution to resistance is proportional
to the material density of the fluid through which an object moves. Thus, the experiments
gave Newton grounds to reject a mechanical aether, although with his usual care he did not
make the stronger claim that they rule out an aether altogether.6
Although these considerations triggered Newton’s radical conversion, they were not
decisive for his contemporaries and successors. In Newton’s later treatment in the Principia,
5See Newton (1999, General Scholium to Book II, Section 6, pp. 722-3). Note that external resistance
may arise due to the air alone or the air and the aether conjointly, but the experiment is designed so that
external resistance (as well as buoyancy of the air) is held constant. Cf. Kuhn (1970), pp. 106-8.
6See Smith (2001) for a thorough discussion of these experiments, Newton’s treatment of resistance, and
the changes made to this part of Book II between the first and second editions.
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fluid resistance arises primarily from the inertia of the fluid, and the dominant component of
the force of resistance is proportional to ρv2 (where ρ is the density of the fluid, and v is the
relative velocity). Leibniz objected to this assumption in his correspondence with Clarke,
arguing that “it is not so much the quantity of matter as its difficulty in giving place that
makes resistance” (Alexander 1956, Fifth letter, p. 65). Leibniz had earlier distinguished
between two different sources of resistance, viscosity and density, and argued that the two
make different contributions to the overall resistance for different types of fluids.7 Drawing
this distinction between different types of resistance opens up the possibility of an aetherial
fluid that does not have resistance proportional to density—which would avoid Newton’s
arguments. In fact, as Smith (2001) has emphasized, the possibility is much easier to realize
than Newton had anticipated. In 1752 D’Alembert showed that a fluid without viscosity
has exactly zero resistance, completely undercutting Newton’s proposal that the dominant
contribution to fluid resistance arose from the inertia of the fluid. This error does not detract
from Newton’s genuine insight that a single force law was sufficient to account for planetary
motions, but it does undermine Newton’s empirical case against the aether. Of course,
the problem was not solely with Newton’s arguments against the aether. Contemporary
versions of aether theory were also based on misconceptions regarding fluids and the nature
of resistance, and any aether theorist faced the daunting challenge of providing an account of
how the aether produced gravitational effects without also causing appreciable resistance.8
2.2 The Geometrical and Dynamical Conceptions of Matter
Newton’s rejection of a mechanical aether left him without a mechanical explanation of
gravitation, along with an awareness of how difficult it would be to provide one. Here we
focus on a fundamental consequence of this awareness for Newton’s thought: he was forced
to reconsider Descartes’ doctrines regarding the nature of body and space and replace them
with ones compatible with the existence of spaces nearly void of matter.
Newton’s most sustained critical discussion of Descartes appears in De grav. The stated
aim of the manuscript is the study of the gravitation and equilibrium of fluids, and it is
written in the geometrical style, beginning with a series of definitions and closing with two
theorems regarding inelastic fluids. Along the way, Newton clears the ground for his own
definitions of space, body, and motion with a long philosophical discussion expressly devoted
to undermining the corresponding Cartesian definitions—to “dispos[ing] of [Descartes’] fig-
menta”, as it were. The main thrust of this long digression is that an adequate definition
7Leibniz was not unique in making such distinctions; Newton himself had also classified distinct types of
fluids in which different mechanisms are the main source of resistance.
8See Aiton (1972) for an account of aether theories developed throughout the 18th century.
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of motion requires an appropriate structure relating locations over time, assigning unique
velocities to moving bodies, and suitably correlating motions to forces.9 Descartes’ plenum
lacked the necessary structure, leaving Descartes with a definition of motion that failed to
support distinctions he appealed to in developing his physical theory. Newton overcame this
defect by introducing space as a distinct entity with a sufficiently strong structure, albeit
an entity that did not fit neatly into traditional ontological categories.10
Before focusing on De grav ’s positive theses, we should note that even in this overtly
philosophical context Newton supported his arguments against Descartes with empirical
evidence in favor of void space. On the basis of pendulum experiments that may have
been the experiments discussed above or a precursor of them, Newton asserted that the
resistance of the aether is “over ten or a hundred thousand times less” than the resistance
of quicksilver (Newton 2004, p. 34).11 Newton also took resistance to moving through a
medium to be a consequence of the material nature of the medium’s parts. As he put it,
“if we set aside altogether every resistance to the passage of bodies, we must also set aside
the corporeal nature [of the medium] utterly and completely” (Newton 2004, p. 34). This
is because two bodies cannot simultaneously occupy the same region of space, and so, one
body resists the passage of another body through the region it occupies. We noted above
that this view was controversial, but if it is accepted then the failure to detect resistance is
decisive evidence against the Cartesian plenum.
Rejecting the plenum posed a clear challenge to the Cartesian identification of extension
as the principal attribute of body. In De grav, Newton singled out Descartes’ so-called
“elimination argument” (as presented in Principles of Philosophy, II.4 & II.11) as the main
9What is actually required for the dynamical theory of the Principia is the distinction between inertial and
non-inertial motion; this only requires an affine connection (the structure needed to differentiate between
straight and curved spacetime trajectories), and not the stronger structure that would be provided by
identifying the “same position” over time; see Stein (1967). However, Newton seems not to have been
entirely clear on this issue at the time of composition of the De grav ; some of his criticisms of Descartes
thus presume a stronger structure than necessary.
10For further analysis of Newton’s criticisms of Descartes here and in the Scholium to the Definitions in
the Principia see, for example, Stein (1967); Rynasiewicz (1995); DiSalle (2002).
11In De grav Newton briefly alluded to pendulum experiments but said almost nothing about them, and
his stated conclusion is remarkably imprecise. B. J. T. Dobbs (1991, pp. 134-43 and 1988) argues that these
pendulum experiments were performed between the composition of another manuscript, De aere et aethere
(published in Newton 1962), and De grav. Westfall (1971), pp. 375-77, 341 reaches a similar conclusion,
although he dates the sequence of events to 1679 rather than 1684. We find the ordering of events plausible
(whether they occurred in 1679 or 1684), but there is insufficient textual evidence to make a compelling
case. Jim Ruffner has also brought discussions of the aether in (undated) manuscripts regarding comets to
our attention, and it is unclear whether these manuscripts are consistent with Dobbs’ suggested dating.
De aere describes a probable precursor to these experiments, which fails to distinguish between air re-
sistance and aether resistance since it fails to account for the buoyancy of the surrounding medium; De
grav reports conclusions that might be related to the more sophisticated experiments. However, as Ruffner
emphasized, the quoted result is both much more uncertain and numerically incompatible with Newton’s
later measurements of resistance.
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argument in favor of this thesis. According to Newton, Descartes argued that various sensory
properties such as hardness, weight, and color can be abstracted from a body without
endangering the status of that body as a body. Only the elimination of extension can
destroy a body’s corporeality, and so extension alone constitutes body’s principal attribute,
or, as Newton put it “pertain to [body’s] essence” (Newton 2004, p. 21).12 To Descartes’
argument, Newton countered that to be recognized as such, a body had to possess not
only extension, but “faculties,” in particular the ability to stimulate perceptions and to
“transfer action” to other bodies.13 The core of Newton’s critique was the claim that
“although philosophers do not define substance as an entity that can act upon things, yet
everyone tacitly understands this” (Newton 2004, p. 21). Newton—contra Descartes—held
that what we should primarily care about is not what a substance is, but what it does.
This difference of orientation is also evident in the stated aim of Newton’s metaphysical
speculation regarding body. Unlike Descartes’ goal in the Principles, Newton’s goal in De
grav was the development of an account of body sufficient to serve as a basis for physical
theory and sufficient to capture the phenomenal properties of bodies, the properties of
“beings, in every way similar to bodies, whose creation we cannot fail to acknowledge to be
within the power of God—and which thus we cannot certainly declare not to be bodies”.
Newton was clear, however, that he could not establish anything more than the sufficiency
of his hypothetical account. In particular, he made no claims to reveal the essence or nature
of body.14
But we must not stress only the differences between Newton and Descartes. Certainly,
Newton’s conception of body in De grav differed crucially from Descartes’ both in its con-
tent and metaphysical pretensions. However, Newton’s conception still possessed vestiges
of Cartesianism. Although Newton defined body in terms of regions of space endowed with
12After imagining what a material body would be like if its hardness were removed and concluding that it
would still be a body, Descartes wrote that “In the same way, it can be shown that weight, color, and all the
other properties of this kind which are experienced in material substance, can be taken away; leaving that
substance intact. From this it follows that the nature of matter does not depend on any such properties,
but consists solely in the fact that it is a substance which has extension” (the last clause is present only in
the French edition) (Descartes 1985, Vol. 1, p. 224) AT VIIA 42, CSM I 224.
13Newton was also familiar with the predecessor of the argument of Principles II.4 in the Second Medi-
tation, but does not address it explicitly in De grav ; see Harrison (1978, p. 132) and McGuire and Tamny
(1983, p. 23). The criticism that something other than extension could not be eliminated was not unique
to Newton; Leibniz, for example, also argued that an adequate concept of body must include a force of
resistance or impenetrability in addition to extension.
14The epistemological status of Newton’s account of space is quite different than that of his account of
body. While Newton emphasized the tentative status of the account of body—it is merely one possible
account of the structure of bodies compatible with our experiences—he did not treat the account of space
as conjectural and tentative in the same sense, as Stein (2002) emphasizes. For this reason, when we speak
of the ‘nature’ of body according to Newton, we do not mean to impute to him any form of essentialism
or a conception of natural philosophy according to which the goal of philosophizing is to draw observable
consequences from the the natures of the ontological primitives.
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additional attributes—these additional attributes being foreign to Descartes’ account of
body—he still followed Descartes by treating bodies as regions of space, as extended geo-
metrical structures, albeit not geometrical structures simpliciter. In De grav, the character
of bodies is dependent to some extent on the character of space. Space, in turn, is an
essentially geometrical structure—it is everywhere full of “all kinds of figures, everywhere
spheres, cubes, triangles, straight lines, everywhere circular elliptical, parabolical, and all
other kinds of figures, and those of all shapes and sizes, even though they are not disclosed
to sight” (Newton 2004, p. 22, et seq.). Bodies, as regions of space, are consequently
essentially geometrical, although they admit other essential properties as well.15
In De grav, Newton treated bodies as “determined quantities of extension which om-
nipresent God endows with certain conditions”(Newton 2004, p. 28, original emphasis).
These conditions are:
(1) that they be mobile; and therefore I did not say that they are numerical
parts of space which are absolutely immobile, but only definite quantities which
may be transferred from space to space;
(2) that two of this kind cannot coincide anywhere; that is, that they may be
impenetrable, and hence that oppositions obstruct their mutual motions and
they are reflected in accord with certain laws;
(3) that they can excite various perceptions of the senses and the imagination
in created minds (Newton 2004, p. 28-29)
Central to Newton’s account of body here is the notion that bodies are, first and foremost,
“determined quantities of extension.” The reliance on a determinate spatial substratum
as a necessary precondition for the existence of bodies is one of the main features of his
account. After providing the above definition of body, Newton immediately advertised one
of its main anti-Aristotelian implications; namely, that is does away with the need to posit
a substratum without properties as the metaphysical support for properties and forms and
instead makes due with space itself:
[F]or the existence of [bodies] it is not necessary that we suppose some unintelli-
gible substance to exist in which as subject there may be an inherent substantial
form; extension and an act of the divine will are enough. Extension takes the
place of the substantial subject in which the form of the body is conserved by
the divine will; and that product of the divine will is the form of formal reason of
the body denoting every dimension of space in which the body is to be produced
(Newton 2004, p. 29).
The analogy between Newton’s account and hylomorphism makes clear that extension was as
central to Newton’s conception of body as the substantial subject was for the conception of
15See Stein (2002) for the relation in De grav of Newton’s account of space to his account of bodies.
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body of his Aristotelian adversaries (as Newton understood them). On Newton’s account,
extension is necessary for the application of so-called “form” (in the guise of the three
conditions listed above) and thus necessary for the existence of body. “Body,” as Newton
wrote in the official “Definitions” portion of De grav, “is that which fills space” (Newton
2004, p. 13). It is not necessarily that which gravitates, nor that which moves, nor that
which is tangible and visible (although it may also be any of those)—it is that which fills
space.
Although we cannot discuss the matter at length here, it seems to us that the conception
of body as a filled-in quantity of extension takes precedence in De grav over the nascent
conception of body as that which is governed by the laws of motion, a conception we will
return to shortly. Although in De grav Newton certainly held that bodies must move
“in accord to certain laws,” the phrase does not acquire any special significance without
the juxtaposition of De grav against the later dynamically-focused Principia and De motu
drafts. Taken by itself, De grav seems to define body primarily as a region of filled-in
extension and only secondarily as a region whose motion obeys further law-like constraints,
although both elements are clearly present and clearly necessary. In fact, Newton often
wrote in De grav as if bodies are, in the first instance, impenetrable regions of extension,
and only in the second instance mobile, impenetrable regions of extension. For example,
Newton motivated his “determined quantities of extension” definition with the following
passage:
If [God] should ... cause some space ... to be impervious to bodies and thus stop
or reflect light and all impinging things, it seems impossible that we should not
consider this space really to be a body from the evidence of our senses (which
constitute our sole judges in this matter); for it ought to be regarded as tangible
on account of its impenetrability, and visible, opaque, and colored on account
of the reflection of light, and it will resonate when struck because the adjacent
air will be moved by the blow (Newton 2004, pp. 27-28).
In other words, tangibility, visibility, and other traits that constitute the “corporeality” of
matter according to our senses all depend, in the first instance, upon the impenetrability of
geometrical regions of space. Motion has a secondary role in constituting that corporeality
because motions only make manifest to our senses that impenetrable geometrical regions are
in fact impenetrable, in accordance with a broadly mechanical conception of the operations
of our sensory apparatus. In the train of reasoning of the above passage, motion is only
introduced once regions of space are rendered impenetrable:
[W]e may suppose that there are empty spaces scattered through the world,
one of which, defined by certain [spatial] limits, happens by divine power to be
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impervious to bodies, and by hypothesis it is manifest that this would resist the
motions of bodies and perhaps reflect them, and assume all the properties of a
corporeal particle, except that it will be regarded as motionless. If we should
suppose that that impenetrability is not always maintained in the same part of
space but can be transferred here and there according to certain laws, yet so
that the quantity and shape of that impenetrable space are not changed, there
will be no property of body which it does not possess (Newton 2004, p. 28).
Of course, even if mobility has only a secondary status in this passage, it is clearly essential
to Newton’s account of body both here and in the “determined quantities of extension”
definition. However, our point is merely that it is mobility of impenetrable regions of exten-
sion that is essential, not mobility taken by itself. The centrality in Newton’s account of
bodies of the impenetrability of the extensional substratum reveals Newton’s residual Carte-
sianism: in De grav he considers bodies to be essentially extended geometrical structures—
geometrical structures that are made real by a host of conditions, but geometrical structures
nevertheless.
Newton’s manner of quantifying body in De grav further illustrates his residual Carte-
sianism. When Newton provided a measure of a body’s quantity of matter, he did so
through a body’s geometrical rather than dynamical properties. After defining the abso-
lute quantity of force as a product of the force’s intension (“the degree of its quality”) and
extension (“the amount of space or time in which it operates”) Newton wrote:
[M]otion is either more intense or more remiss, as the space traversed in the
same time is greater or less, for which reason a body is usually said to move
more swiftly or more slowly. Again, motion is more or less extended as the body
moved is greater or less, or as it is diffused through a larger or smaller body.
And the absolute quantity of motion is composed of both the velocity and the
magnitude of the moving body (Newton 2004, p. 37).
In modern terminology, Newton equated momentum (which he calls the “force of motion”)
to the product of the velocity (the intension) and the “magnitude of the moving body”
(the extension). Note, however, that the magnitude of the moving body is measured by the
body’s volume (“the amount of space in which [the force of motion] operates”) rather than
by the body’s resistance to impressed forces (i.e., by its inertia). Since the force of motion
is equated throughout Newton’s writings (from the Waste Book onward) to the product of
velocity and quantity of matter, in the above passage Newton estimated a body’s quantity
of matter through its quantity of extension (see Herivel 1965, p. 26). We call this method
of quantification, along with Newton’s account of the nature of bodies insofar as it relies
on a substratum of determined quantities of extension, Newton’s geometrical conception of
matter.
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Two caveats must be made regarding this geometrical conception. First, the conception
is Cartesian in inspiration, but it is not wholly Cartesian. Newton did not attempt to reduce
all of a body’s properties to its geometrical properties, nor did he treat any other single
property of body as its principal attribute. Newton’s conception is less metaphysically
minimalist and is presented as less certain than Descartes’. However, Newton did follow
Descartes in considering extension both as essential to our understanding of body and as
essential to the practice of physics vis-a`-vis the measure of the quantity of matter associated
with body. Second, although we’ve highlighted the geometrical conception’s indebtedness
to Newton’s residual Cartesianism, the conception is also closely tied to Newton’s atomism,
particularly his belief in the uniformity of nature. That story is quite important for the
development of Newton’s thought, but it would take us far from our current course. We
will, however, return to the uniformity of nature briefly in §4, when we consider Newton’s
allegiance to the geometrical conception in light of Cotes’ ‘two-globes’ objection.
At any rate, in De grav, the geometrical measure of quantity of matter is not supple-
mented with a precise dynamical measure, as it is in the De Motu drafts leading to the
Principia as well as in the Principia itself. According to what we call the dynamical con-
ception of matter refined in these texts, a quantity of matter is measured by its response to
impressed force, not by the volume of space which it impenetrably fills. As with the geomet-
rical conception, the dynamical conception of matter also incorporates a view regarding the
nature of bodies, one we will return to shortly. Newton introduced the dynamical measure
of quantity of matter in Definitions I and III of the Principia, and it is the one most familiar
to modern readers. In Definition III, Newton states that the internal force of a body (its
vis insita) “is always proportional to the body and does not differ in any way from the
inertia [vis inertia] of the mass except in the manner in which it is conceived (Newton 1999,
p. 404).” We are to understand that vis insita is also proportional to a body’s quantity of
matter since Definition I states that:
I mean this quantity whenever I use the term “body” or “mass” in the following
pages (Newton 1999, p. 404).
Together with Law II, these two definitions establish a proportionality between a body’s
quantity of matter and the force responsible for the body’s dynamical properties.16
Although Definition I also states that “Quantity of matter is a measure of matter that
arises from its density and volume jointly,” the quantification method implied by Definition
III is used throughout the Principia almost exclusively. In fact, in Definition I itself Newton
made explicit that quantity of matter “can always be known from a body’s weight for—by
16For a discussion of the nature of vis insita, see McGuire (1994). For a more recent discussion of the
connection between vis insita and vis centrifuga in orbital motion, see Meli (2006).
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making very accurate experiment with pendulums—I have found it to be proportional to
the weight.”
This is a far cry from the quantification method suggested in De Grav. Of course,
Newton did define force in De grav as either “external”—“one that generates, destroys,
or otherwise changes impressed motion in some body”—or “internal”—“by which existing
motion or rest is conserved in a body, and by which any body endeavors to continue in its
state and opposes resistance” (Newton 2004, p. 36). But, unlike in the Principia, when it
comes to quantifying body, the dynamical method is not used.17 Lacking a clear statement
of Law II, the dynamical measure of a quantity of matter remains rather vague in De grav
and essentially intertwined with the conception of body as that which fills space. De grav
adumbrates the dynamical conception of matter, but does not contain it fully and certainly
does not contain its central element, the measurement of quantity of matter by a body’s
response to impressed force.18 In the Principia, the two methods of quantifying matter
co-exist, but the geometrical conception is relegated to the wings while the dynamical
conception takes center stage.
What view regarding the nature of bodies goes along with the dynamical measure of
matter in the Principia? In contrast to De grav, in the Principia Newton characterizes
material bodies almost exclusively by their dynamical properties. Although the term “body”
appears several times in the definitions and laws of motion, Newton does not offer a separate
definition of body or an account of its possible nature like the one supplied in De grav. This
suggests a transformation in Newton’s view: the Principia provided clear formulations of
the concept of force and the laws of motion, but bodies are defined only implicitly—as the
entities subject to forces and for which the laws of motion hold.19 The nature of body in
the theoretical context of the Principia thus depends upon whatever constraints are implied
by satisfaction of the laws.20 Furthermore, the empirical support for this implicit account
17In the De grav Newton used the term vis inertia for the internal principle of motion (p. 36), in much
the same sense as he used the term in an excised portion of Definition 1 in the Lucasian lectures (1685,
Newton 1981, Vol. 5). This is by contrast with his usage of vis insita in the early De Motu drafts (see
Herivel 1965, pp. 26-28). We thank George Smith for pointing this out to us. Yet despite the appearance of
the term vis inertia, De grav is a transitional text which only hints at the concept of vis inertia developed
in the Principia. This is not surprising, since in De grav Newton is working out the metaphysics of “natural
power” on which vis insita ultimately depends; see Stein (1991).
18For example, Newton writes that “Bodies are denser when their inertia is more intense, and rarer when
it is more remiss” (Newton 2004, p. 37), but is committed to conceiving of the absolute measure of force as
the product of the intension of the force and the extension of the body in which the force is acting.
19Newton did define “body” in unpublished definitions intended for the third edition of the Principia,
but these definition only make the reliance on dynamical properties explicit, see McGuire (1966). We will
discuss these briefly in §4.
20Although we do not have the space here to discuss this view in detail, we are influenced by Katherine
Brading’s account of Newton’s “methodological solution” of the problem of individuation of bodies; see her
contribution to this volume.
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of the nature of bodies derives from the support for the laws of motion and the mechanical
theory based on them.
Yet the dynamics of the Principia place surprisingly weak constraints on what could
count as a body.21 In particular, “bodies” satisfying all the Newtonian laws of motion need
not have any geometrical properties whatsoever. This may appear to conflict with Newton’s
various theorems regarding extended bodies, such as the famous proofs (Principia I.71-75)
to the effect that a spherical body can be treated as if the mass were concentrated at a
point. However, even these proofs only require that the force acting on or produced by the
whole body is the sum over forces related to its constituent parts. They do not require the
attribution of geometrical properties to the parts of the spherical bodies and are compati-
ble with bodies treated as Boscovichian point-particles characterized by parameters such as
“quantity of matter” that have no geometrical basis.22 That the dynamical conception of
matter is so austere reflects the limited mathematical framework of the Principia. The gen-
eralization of Newtonian theory to continuum mechanics (by the likes of Euler and Cauchy)
leads to a much richer notion of body, which does have implications for the geometrical
properties of bodies defined implicitly via the laws of motion. For example, Cauchy’s gen-
eralization of Newton’s first law involves contact forces defined over the boundary as well
as the outward normal defined on the boundary; Boscovichian point particles do not satisfy
these laws of motion as they lack boundaries and Cauchy’s law does not apply.23
That said, the geometrical conception of matter developed in the De grav did not dis-
appear from Newton’s thought following the elaboration of the dynamical conception in the
Principia. In drafts of corollaries to Proposition 6 of book III written in the 1690s, Newton
assesses the connections between gravitational aethers, matter theory, and the existence of
void.24 In doing so, Newton assumes that the appropriate measure of quantity of matter
is the volume of the basic particulate constituents of matter. Although we cannot discuss
these manuscripts here, they indicate that Newton continued to take the geometrical con-
ception of matter seriously after the publication of the Principia. Finally, Newton’s reply
21We thank Michael Friedman for a question that prompted the clarification in this paragraph. See also
the discussion of quantity of matter in Steinle (1992).
22That is not to say that it is straightforward to apply Newton’s laws to “point-particles”; part of Euler’s
achievement in the Mechanica was to formulate the second law as “F = ma” and to show how to apply this
law to the point-particles composing rigid bodies and fluids. We owe this point to George Smith, who also
emphasized two further points: first, that the geometrical properties of bodies do play a limited role in the
Principia, in particular in the study of resistance forces in Book II. Second, Newton had already begun to
treat issues in continuum mechanics, in the treatment of wave propagation through fluids in Section 8 of
Book II. It was only with later work that the implications of this approach for the geometrical properties of
bodies were clarified.
23See Truesdell (1968) for a historical account of the later contributions, and Smith (2007) for a philo-
sophically oriented discussion of the notion of body appropriate for classical continuum mechanics.
24For a thorough discussion of these manuscripts, see McGuire (1967).
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to Cotes’s “two globes” objection—which also concerns Proposition 6—clearly relies on the
geometrical conception, and took place over 20 years later, in 1711. We will return to the
two globes objection in §4 below. Now we turn to the two types of a posteriori, empiricist
arguments we believe are associated with the two different conceptions of matter.
2.3 The A Posteriori Character of the Geometrical Conception of Mat-
ter
In what sense did Newton establish, or believe he had established, his geometrical conception
of body a posteriori? Two distinct a posteriori contributions can be discerned. First, the
results of the pendulum experiments and the accuracy of Kepler’s “laws” pushed Newton
to reject the Cartesian identification of body with extension. In this sense, his path towards
a new conception of body is similar to his path towards a new conception of light in his
optical work in the 1670s.25 In both cases, Newton took a rather narrow set of experimental
results to be sufficiently crucial to warrant an overall revision of a fundamental concept of
natural philosophy.
But there is an important difference: whereas the prism experiments, the crucial ex-
periments in Newton’s early optical work, were used to both refute the extant conception
of light and suggest a new conception (i.e., that white light is not a natural kind but is
composed of individually homogeneous light rays of differing refrangibilities), the pendu-
lum experiments were used only to refute the Cartesian doctrine. On our account, Newton
rejected an account of gravity based on the results of pendulum experiments along with his
success in modeling planetary motions using a single force law without a resisting medium.
This rejection then spilled over to the associated Cartesian accounts of body and space.
However, the constructive element of Newton’s geometrical conception of body was not se-
cured by an experimentum crucis; rather it seems to have been secured by a different type
of argument from the phenomena.
This argument proceeds from the experience of any body whatsoever. Newton attempted
in De grav to provide an account of body that is sufficient for capturing the “evidence of our
senses.” The traits of body he aimed to save were all quite generic and are reflected in the
overall character of our experience; for example, that body is visible, tangible, audible under
certain conditions, etc. Newton’s account of body as mobile, impenetrable, and sensible
extension is only able to successfully save these traits because it is set against a background
of natural philosophical presuppositions, but these presuppositions were not constituted by
a set of first principles as they were for many mechanical philosophers. Rather, they were
constituted by a set of natural philosophical explanations Newton considers plausible—e.g.,
25For an account of this development see, for example, Shapiro (2004); Stein (ms).
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that an object is visible because it reflects light or that it is audible because it is capable
of pushing the adjacent air. However, given this larger natural philosophical framework,
the evidential basis for Newton’s conception of body includes any and all experiences of
body. Moreover, success within Newton’s natural philosophical framework does not rely on
any quantitative notion of “strength of evidence” that can help arbitrate between Newton’s
and possible competing accounts—where by “strength of evidence” we mean any measure
of the fit between a given theory and its evidential basis that allows discrimination among
competing theories according to degree of evidential warrant. Strikingly, the relationship
between Newton’s account of body and the evidence on which it is based does not involve
a sophisticated notion of evidential warrant of the type found in the argument for universal
gravitation. Rather, it involves a notion much closer to the one employed by traditional
mechanical philosophers in order to justify their mechanical models, but one that does not
appeal to first principles or privileged modes of explanation. We will return to both types
of arguments in the following section, but note Newton’s explicit reference to the significant
underdetermination of De grav ’s account of body:
[I]t is hardly given to us to know. . . whether matter could be created in one
way only, or whether there are several ways by which different beings similar to
bodies could be produced. . . [H]ence I am reluctant to say positively what the
nature of bodies is, but I would rather describe a certain kind of being similar in
every way to bodies, and whose creation we cannot deny to be within the power
of God, so that we can hardly say that it is not body (Newton 2004, p. 27).
Newton is explicitly open to the possibility that another hypothesis regarding the nature of
body can save the phenomena equally well.
This a posteriori method of arriving at claims regarding the nature of matter resembles
in certain respects the one offered in Rule III of the Regulae Philosophandi and its drafts.26
In Rule III, Newton claimed that certain qualities of bodies are “universal,” qualities that
can be attributed to any body whatsoever and so constitute the core of our understanding
of body, the “foundation of all natural philosophy” (Newton 1999, p. 796). Often, Newton
referred to such claims of universality as being “deduced from phenomena” (e.g., (Newton
1999, p. 943)). The list of universal qualities consists of extension, hardness, impenetra-
bility, mobility, and inertia. However, Newton’s evidence for their universality and thus
the philosophical import of Rule III is by no means homogeneous. One of the theses of
26See McGuire (1970, 1968). Although we will not discuss the drafts here, their implicit methodology is
even closer to that of De grav than that of Rule III, both in the evidential basis they recommend for natural
philosophical claims and the way in which the relationship between that basis and the resulting claims is
conceived.
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this essay is that deducing or gathering propositions “from phenomena” does not have a
univocal meaning for Newton, and so the resemblance of Rule III to De grav concerns only
the first three qualities—more will be said about the rest in §3.3. First, Rule III, like De
grav, appeals to our general experience of bodies as the evidential basis from which claims
regarding the extension, hardness, and impenetrability of bodies ought to be drawn. For
example, Newton wrote in language echoing that of his earlier treatise that:
The extension of bodies is known to us only through our senses. . . [and] because
extension is found in all sensible bodies, it is ascribed to all bodies universally.
We know by experience that some bodies are hard. . . [and] justly infer from this
not only the hardness of the undivided particles of bodies that are accessible to
our senses, but also of all other bodies. That all bodies are impenetrable we
gather not by reason but by our senses. We find those bodies that we handle to
impenetrable, and hence we conclude that impenetrability is a property of all
bodies universally.(Newton 1999, p. 795, emphasis added).
In each case, our experience of bodies, broadly conceived, forms the evidential basis of the
generalization. Of course, according to Rule III only those qualities that pass the intension
and remission criterion and that are found in “all bodies on which experiments can be made”
can be “taken as qualities of all bodies universally” (Newton 1999, p. 795). Consequently,
the evidential basis recommended by Rule III is more restrictive than the one used in De
grav. Only some features of our experience of bodies remain relevant to generalization
about the nature of body; visibility and audibility, for example, are ruled out. However, the
remaining features are those that are truly general—they are part of all our experiences of
body. In fact, achieving this generality is precisely the point of Newton’s application of the
intention and remission criterion. Any quality that is not always part of our experience of
bodies—i.e., one that can be remitted to zero and thus disappear, or one that is not present
in some bodies—is ruled out.
Second, regarding the first four qualities mentioned, Rule III, like De grav, does not
utilize a notion of evidential warrant that is similar in complexity to the one used throughout
the Principia. This is because while the rule’s condition of application—the intention and
remission criterion—can be made precise, it is unclear when in the course of empirical
investigation we can be content that it is sufficiently satisfied for “all bodies on which
experiments can be made” to warrant judgments of universality. Newton’s examples do not
help. Newton argued that the extension of bodies is made manifest in all sensible bodies.
However, he also held that we know by experience that hardness is only found in some
bodies while impenetrability is only found in “those bodies that we handle”—presumably
a smaller class than “all sensible bodies”. Is the judgement of universality regarding one
of these better off than the others? Newton hinted at a notion of strength of evidence,
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but did not make it explicit. He wrote that “the argument from phenomena will be even
stronger for universal gravity than for the impenetrability of bodies, for which. . . we have
not a single experiment, and not even an observation, in the case of the heavenly bodies”
(Newton 1999, p. 796). It seems that something like simple enumerative strength is at
work here: the more instances of a quality we have, the stronger the judgement of its
universality. However, this is still a far cry from the sophisticated and more robust relation
between theory and evidence implicit in the Principia.
The lack of a robust notion of evidential warrant or “strength of evidence” would not
be bothersome by itself, but we will argue in §4 that Newton, on at least one occasion,
overemphasized the evidence in favor of the geometrical conception of matter. The reason,
we will argue, is that Newton failed to distinguish the type of argument given in De Grav
for the geometrical conception of matter from the type of argument used in the Principia.
We must first clarify the latter type of argument. To do so, we’ll use Cotes’ invisible hand
objection.
3 The Invisible Hand
As the editing of the Principia’s second edition neared completion in 1713, Roger Cotes took
on the task of writing a preface contrasting Newton’s “experimental philosophy” with the
approach of the Cartesians and Aristotelians. To exemplify Newton’s method he intended
to present a “short deduction of the Principle of Gravity from the Phænomena of Nature, in
a popular way” (Newton 1977, V, Doc. 985, p. 391). However, he encountered a difficulty
in presenting the argument given in the Principia.
Cotes accepted the first two steps of Newton’s argument for universal gravitation, to
the effect that (1) the planets are held in their orbits by an inverse square centripetal force
directed towards the sun, and (2) that this force can be identified with terrestrial gravity,
via the moon test. What gave him pause was the next step, first mentioned in Cor. 1 of
Proposition 5 of Book III and discussed again in Proposition 7. In this third step, Newton
applied the third law to the centripetal force holding planets in their orbits, and concluded
that a given planet also attracts the sun.27 In other words, Newton argued that gravity is
a mutual interaction between the sun and planet. Cotes’s invisible hand objection is meant
to illustrate that this third step requires further hypotheses about the nature of gravitation.
Cotes wrote:
27The third law reads as follows in all editions: “To any action there is always an opposite and equal
reaction; in other words, the actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal and always opposite in
direction” (Newton 1999, p. 417).
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...ye Force by which they [the planets] are continually diverted from the Tan-
gents of their Orbits is directed & tends towards their Central Bodies. Which
Force (from what cause whatever it proceeds) may therefore not improperly be
call’d Centripetal in respect of ye revolving Body & Attractive in respect of the
Central. [...] But in the first Corollary of the 5th [proposition of Book III] I
meet with a difficulty, it lyes in these words Et cum attractio omnis mutua sit. I
am persuaded they are then true when the Attraction may properly be so call’d,
otherwise they may be false. You will understand my meaning by an Example.
Suppose two Globes A & B placed at a distance from each other upon a Table,
& that whilst A remains at rest B is moved towards it by an invisible Hand.
A by-stander who observes this motion but not the cause of it, will say that B
does certainly tend to the centre of A, & thereupon he may call the force of the
invisible Hand the Centripetal force of B & the Attraction of A since ye effect
appeares the same as if it did truly proceed from a proper & real Attraction of
A. But then I think he cannot by virtue of this Axiom [Attractio omni mutua
est] conclude contrary to his Sense & Observation that the Globe A does also
move towards the Globe B & will meet it at the common centre of Gravity of
both Bodies. This is what stops me in the train of reasoning by which I would
make out as I said in a popular way the 7th Prop. Lib. III. I shall be glad to
have Your resolution of the difficulty, for such I take it to be. [...] For ’till this
objection be cleared I would not undertake to answer one who should assert that
You do Hypothesim fingere. I think You seem tacitly to make this Supposition
that the Attractive force resides in the Central Body (Newton 1977, V, Doc.
985, p. 392).
There are two ways of reading Cotes. On a first, literal reading, there is a stark empir-
ical contrast between the “invisible hand” scenario and Newton’s account of gravitation.
According to Cotes, the invisible hand imparts motion to Globe B without imparting mo-
tion to Globe A—Globe A does not move. According to Newton, however, interactions
are truly mutual, and so the central body of a gravitational system (represented by Globe
A) is predicted to move, however slightly. The mismatch between prediction and observed
motion is Cotes’ problem: “I think [an observer] cannot by virtue of this Axiom [Attractio
omni mutua est] conclude contrary to his Sense & Observation that the Globe A does also
move towards the Globe B” (Newton 1977, V, Doc. p. 985, p. 392, emphasis added).
Cotes is presuming that in a gravitational system, like in the invisible hand case, “Sense &
Observation” will always show that the central body does not move. This is a false empir-
ical presumption. Determining the motion of a central body in a real-world case is by no
means a simple task, but it is possible. In fact, for truly mutual interactions between two
bodies (without external forces that effect the two bodies differently), there is a “two-body”
correction to Kepler’s third law (see, e.g., Smith 2002b, p. 44). Although Newton or Cotes
could not have made an empirical case in favor of this correction term on the basis of the
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data available to them, the question was open to empirical resolution. Cotes jumped the
gun by presupposing that observation will show that the central body does not move.
Yet this was a perfectly natural response on Cotes’ part. Neither Newton nor Cotes could
have made an empirical case for the motion of the central body of the solar system, and
Cotes was right to press Newton on that point. But Newton did not respond directly to this
challenge and instead subtly shifted the terms of the debate. To account for the subsequent
exchanges we will focus on a second, slightly modified, reading of Cotes. On this reading,
we take Cotes to suggest that there are two invisible hands acting in concert to move both
globes in a way that is identical with the predictions of Newton’s theory. This new scenario
does not amount to an empirically distinguishable alternative to Newton’s description of
planetary motions; instead, it reveals that Newton’s argument for the extension of the third
law to the central body rested upon an unacknowledged, substantive assumption about the
nature of gravity.28 Although Cotes clearly claimed that Globe A does not move, Newton
seems to have responded to Cotes as if he had posed this more telling objection to Newton’s
methodology.
Newton’s replies to Cotes focused on two points, both of which were reflected in changes
to the text of the Principia. First, Newton defended the third law as a crucial feature of
his conception of force by showing that it is essential to extending the first law to systems
of interacting bodies. We will argue that this reply missed the point (at least of the second,
stronger reading of Cotes); Cotes did not challenge the third law itself, but rather the iden-
tification of the bodies involved in the application of the third law. Nonetheless, Newton’s
discussion of the third law reveals its importance in going from a mathematical character-
ization of force based on the first two laws to a physical characterization of forces treated
as mutual interactions among bodies. Second, Newton responded to the charge of feigning
hypotheses; he clarified the nature of hypotheses in his method and argued that objections
of a particular kind, exemplified by Cotes’ invisible hand, should simply be set aside. We
will follow Newton’s lead in using this as an occasion to consider the status of the laws of
motion (and to make it clear why we do not read this as Newton evading the question).
We will briefly contrast the limited sense in which the laws are “hypothetical” on Newton’s
account with the role of hypotheses for his contemporaries and the a posteriori character
of the geometrical conception of matter, and by doing this describe the sophisticated a
posteriori reasoning made available by the mathematical framework of the Principia, the
28Kant re-discovered the problem, apparently independently of Cotes, and characterized Newton as being
“at variance with himself” for denying that gravitational attraction is an essential property of matter; see
Remark 2 to Proposition 7 of the Dynamics (4:515) and the discussion in Friedman (1992)[pp. 149-159].
Several more recent commentators have also discussed the invisible hand objection: Densmore (1996); Koyre´
(1965); Harper (2002); Stein (1991); see also Harper’s contribution to this volume.
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type of reasoning on which the dynamical conception of matter is based.
3.1 Applying the Third Law
The invisible hand highlights the ambiguity in Newton’s application of the third law in
the third step of the AUG. Suppose that invisible hands and an attractive force produce
indistinguishable motions of an orbiting and a central body. The third law implies that
there is an equal and opposite force corresponding to the force holding the body in its orbit,
but it does not specify the nature and location of this force. Should it be a reaction force
acting on the central body, or a force pushing against the invisible hand?
Assume that there is no empirical way to distinguish the two options. Newton’s ar-
gument depends on one of two assumptions. Either, first, gravity is a force of attraction
causally residing in the interacting bodies alone, an attractive force “properly so call’d”
as Cotes put it; or, second, whatever underlying mechanism is responsible for gravitation
must itself produce a reaction force on the central body. Suppose, for example, that an
aether mediates the gravitational interaction. Newton’s application of the third law would
be appropriate only if there is no net momentum transfer from the two gravitating bodies
to the aether. In this case, even though the third law properly applied yields a reaction force
on the aether pressing against the planet, the aether interacts with the planet and sun in
precisely the right way to produce a reaction force on the sun. Either option conflicts with
Newton’s claim that the validity of the AUG does not depend upon “hypotheses” regarding
the nature of gravity.29
Newton responded to Cotes by defending the validity of third law of motion itself. He
asked Cotes to consider two bodies A and B acted on by no net external forces, such that
29A second issue regarding the third law apparently did not concern Cotes: granting that the reaction
force inheres in the central body, are the motions cited in the AUG sufficient to establish that the action
and reaction force are equal in magnitude? In modern terms: The celestial bodies interact via acceleration
fields that are fixed by the product of the gravitational constant G and the mass M of the body producing
the field. Purely gravitational interactions do not provide any basis for distinguishing the contributions of
G and M . Consider, for example, two bodies with masses MA,MB interacting gravitationally (see Harper
(2002) for a thorough discussion of this point, which we draw on here). The motion of these two bodies





B , provided that GMA = GAM
′
A and GMB = GBM
′
B . In other words, the masses can
be assigned freely if the value of G is allowed to vary for acceleration fields associated with different bodies.
However, changing the values of the masses to M ′A,M
′
B also changes the motive forces between the two
bodies, spoiling the equality in magnitude required by the third law. The upshot of this second objection
is that Newton had to also assume, quite plausibly, that the value of G is a characteristic of this type of
force and not a characteristic of the body producing the acceleration field. Unless G is a truly “universal”
constant (having the same value for all bodies), the motion in response to an acceleration field produced by
body A cannot be used to measure MA. The assumption that G is a universal constant amounts to treating
the various acceleration fields produced by the celestial bodies as instances of the same type of force, and
Cotes did not challenge this assumption.
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the forces between A and B do not satisfy the third law. Say, for example, that A exerts
a greater force on B than vice versa. Newton emphasized that the resulting imbalance
of forces would cause the bodies to accelerate off to infinity, a result that conflicts both
with experience and the first law of motion (Newton 1977, V, Doc. 988, p. 397). Newton
added text to the Principia to the same effect. In the scholium following the Laws of
Motion, Newton asked the reader to imagine sections of the Earth cut off by parallel planes
equidistant from the center.30 As before, an imbalance of the gravitational forces felt by
these two parts of the Earth would lead to the Earth accelerating off to infinity with no
net external force.31 These examples reveal the intimate connection between the third and
first laws. In order for the first law to hold for the center of mass of a closed system of
interacting bodies, the third law must hold for the interactions among the bodies, although
Newton’s examples only involve contiguous bodies pressing against one another.32
This line of response highlights the importance of the “mutuality” of force, the crucial
novelty introduced in Newton’s formulation of the laws of motion. As Stein (2002) has
emphasized, speaking of separate forces acting on two bodies, which happen to come in
an action-reaction pair, is misleading. In Newton’s usage, the “force” corresponds to an
interaction between bodies that is not broken down into separate “actions” and “reactions,”
except in our descriptions of it. Newton’s own “popular” version of the third book, the
System of the World, included a clear statement to this effect:
It is true that we may consider one body as attracting, another as attracted;
30Newton had used a similar example in the first edition of the Principia; in the earlier example, A and
B are separated by an obstacle, so that the application of the third law to the pressure exerted by bodies A
and B on the obstacle can be extended to the attractions between them.
31Applying this line of reasoning to orbital motion is less straightforward. Two mutually interacting bodies
with |fAB | = |fBA| describe orbits around a common central point c. The bodies move such that their
distances from c are constant, with the respective distances fixed by the relative strength of the acceleration
fields of the two bodies. If the third law holds, the point c is also the center of mass cm for the two bodies;
at c the weights of the two bodies (that is, their motive forces towards each other) are precisely balanced.
As Harper (2002) shows, if the third law fails (|fAB | 6= |fBA|) then cm no longer coincides with c; instead,
the center of mass cm moves in uniform circular motion around c. Unlike the first two cases, this does
not lead to an obvious violation of the first law such as an isolated body running off to infinity. However,
Newton makes it clear that such motion of cm is incompatible with the laws of motion in Corollary 4 to
the Laws of Motion (Newton 1999, pp. 421-423). Harper (2002) further argues that it is unclear whether
this motion of the center of mass violates the first law, due to an ambiguity in Newton’s discussion of the
first law. The brief explanatory paragraph accompanying the first law gives various examples of motion that
would continue unabated if not for resistance, including the spinning motion of a hoop (Newton 1999, p.
416). Harper concludes from this that Newton may understand the first law to apply to uniform circular
motion (Harper 2002, p. 92). However, we read the expository paragraph as answering an obvious empirical
objection to the first law – that bodies do not remain in motion in everyday experience – rather than as a
further elaboration of the “states of motion” to which the first law applies, especially since the law explicitly
applies to motion “at rest or ... moving uniformly straight forward.” In any case, Newton is quite explicit
in the statement and discussion of Corollary 4.
32For the importance of the notion of a closed system, see Van Dyck’s paper in this volume.
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but this distinction is more mathematical than natural. The attraction resides
in each body towards the other, and is therefore of the same kind in both. [...]
In this sense it is that we are to conceive one single action to be exerted between
two planets arising from the conspiring natures of both. (§20, in Newton (1966),
p. 568)
This conception of force as a single interaction manifested by equal and opposite impressed
forces on separate bodies is built into the Laws of Motion. It also plays a crucial role in
distinguishing apparent forces from real forces, in the following sense. Given a body in
motion, the first two laws allow one to infer the existence of a force producing the motion
that may be well-defined quantitatively (given a definite magnitude and direction), without
considering the question of what produces the force. But the third law further requires that
the force results from an interaction between the body in motion and some other body. The
Coriolis force—the apparent force exemplified by the deflection of bodies from an inertial
trajectory when viewed from a rotating reference frame—illustrates this distinction: the
force is well-defined quantitatively and could be inferred from observing a body in motion
using the first two laws of motion and results from Book I, but there is no “interacting body”
to be found. The first two laws figure primarily in treating forces from a mathematical point
of view whereas the introduction of the third law marks an important physical constraint.
Although Newton famously abstained from requiring a full account of the “physical cause or
reason” of a force as a precondition for establishing its existence, any further account of the
physical nature of the force would have to satisfy the constraint imposed by the third law.33
We do not wish to imply that satisfying the third law is the only further constraint Newton
imposes on a physically real force; Smith (2002a, p. 150) argues that Newton imposes five
conditions that must be satisfied for a component of a mathematically characterized force
to qualify as physical in his discussion of gravity in Book III and resistance forces in Book
II. See also Janiak (2007, 2008), for a careful broader assessment of the distinction between
Newton’s mathematical and physical characterizations of force.
But even granted this conception of force as mutual interaction, Cotes’ query prompted
justification for Newton’s identification of the central body in a gravitational interaction as
the second “conspiring” body. The first two steps of the AUG established that the force
producing the orbits of the celestial bodies is closely related to the respective central bodies:
it is directed toward the central body, and it varies as the inverse square of the distance
from the central body. These features make plausible Newton’s identification of the central
body as the second body whose “conspiring nature” produces the interaction. Furthermore,
33There is much more to be said regarding the subtle distinction Newton draws between a mathematical
and physical characterization of force, its use in defending his account of gravitation, and its relation to
earlier debates regarding the status of physics, mathematics, and physico-mathematics.
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if the list of candidates is limited to other known bodies, there are few, if any, plausible
choices other than the central body. Cotes accepted the first two steps of the AUG, and so
accepted those features of the force law apparently related to the central body. However,
Cotes was correct to insist that this plausibility argument falls short of a proof. Newton’s
rivals pursuing a vortex theory of planetary motion aimed to recover both these aspects of
the force without introducing a truly mutual interaction with the central body. They did so
by introducing an analogue of the “invisible hand”; namely, an aether that was unobservable
except for its hypothesized gravitational effects.
In sum, although this part of Newton’s response emphasizes the viability of the third
law, this clarification is not sufficient to answer Cotes without some further stipulations
regarding the bodies referred to by the law. However plausible these further stipulations
may seem, they beg the question as a reply to Newton’s contemporary critics. And so, one
may charge that these stipulations are inconsistent with Newton’s own method, that they
are feigned hypotheses. Newton responded to this charge directly.
3.2 The Status of the Laws of Motion and The A Posteriori Character
of the Dynamical Conception of Matter
Since Cotes concluded that Newton did indeed “feign hypotheses” in the AUG, Newton
offered two clarifications of the meaning of hypothesis in his method. First, Newton repri-
manded Cotes for applying the term hypothesis too broadly:
... as in Geometry the word Hypothesis is not taken in so large a sense as to
include the Axioms & Postulates, so in experimental Philosophy it is not to be
taken in so large a sense as to include the first Principles or Axiomes wch I call
the laws of motion. These Principles are deduced from Phænomena & made
general by Induction: wch is the highest evidence that a Proposition can have
in this philosophy (Newton 1977, V, Doc. 988, pp. 396–97).
To make this clear in the Principia, Newton directed Cotes to add the widely cited passage
immediately following “hypotheses non fingo” to the General Scholium:
For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis;
and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities,
or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this experimental
philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general
by induction. The impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of bodies, and the laws
of motion and the law of gravity have been found by this method. (Newton 1999,
p. 943).
Thus, apart from defending his application of the third law, Newton further argued that
the laws of motion (and other claims) in the Principia had a quite distinctive status.
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How to characterize this status more precisely is a delicate question, but the exchange
with Cotes and a comparison of Newton with his contemporaries can shed some light on
Newton’s position. Newton clearly regarded the laws of motion as having a much more
secure status than the hypothetical models pursued by “mechanical philosophers” such
as Huygens. Huygens characterized the aim of physics as the construction of mechanical
models that rendered various phenomena intelligible. Confidence in a hypothetical model
was based on the quality of explanations it offered, along with its ability to predict novel
phenomena and other virtues such as simplicity. Yet this approach was open to a well-
known objection: the possibility of alternative models that offered differing, yet equally
satisfactory, explanations.34 Mechanical philosophers typically responded by insisting that
their models satisfied further constraints, such as the compatibility of the models with
certain privileged first principles, particularly with the ontology of matter in motion. These
constraints, however, did not solve the underdetermination problem, they merely limited
its scope.
Newton was well aware of the underdetermined nature of hypothetical reasoning, but he
did not conclude that certainty would forever exceed our grasp in reasoning about natural
phenomena. His criticisms of mechanical philosophers were combined with the assertion
that his own method could establish results with as much certainty “as the nature of things
admit.” This is because Newton insisted on a criterion of evidential warrant distinct from
that of the mechanical philosophers (cf. Harper and Smith 1995). Propositions that met
this more stringent demand qualified as “deduced from the phenomena” or “proved by
experiments,” and Newton claimed that they were not subject to the same objections as
the method of hypotheses. In particular (as we also saw in §2.3) Newton’s reasoning about
natural phenomena did not depend on the conformity of such reasoning with first principles
regarding fundamental natures.
But there is more to “deduction from phenomena” or “proof by experiment” than a
disregard for first principles, particularly in the context of the Principia. Specifying this
difference is no mean feat, but we are able to draw on recent work by Howard Stein,
Bill Harper, and George Smith that advances the understanding of the implicit method-
ology of the Principia by carefully reconstructing its argumentative structure.35 Despite
disagreements on several finer points, this line of work highlights two general contrasts be-
tween Newton and the earlier mechanical philosophers. First, Newton’s predecessors—take
34Newton emphasized this point in response to criticisms of his optical theories: “For if the possibility of
hypothesis is to be the test of the truth and reality of things, I see not how certainty can be obtained in any
science; since numerous hypotheses may be devised, which shall seem to overcome new difficulties” (Newton
1978, p. 106).
35See, in particular, Harper (1990, 2002); Harper and Smith (1995); Smith (2001, 2002a,b); Stein (1991,
ms), and the contributions of Harper and Smith to this volume.
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Galileo, for example—did not deal with the complexity of actual motions in the same way
as Newton. Although the consequences of Galileo’s theory of uniformly accelerated motion
were not taken to apply exactly to actual motions, a rough conformity between actual and
theoretically described motions was taken as evidence in favor of the theory. Yet proper
judgments of conformity require an assessment of factors such as the effects of air resistance
and measurement imprecision, and these are problematic precisely because such factors are
not treated in the theory.36 By way of contrast, Newton had an elegant way of handling the
complexity of actual motions. He took the care to prove theorems that could underwrite
“robust inferences,” that is, inferences whose conclusions (usually claims regarding forces)
hold approximately if their antecedents (usually observational claims) hold approximately
(Smith 2002b). For example, Newton’s use of the precession theorem in the first step of the
AUG makes it possible to infer properties of the gravitational force law from actual motions
even if they only approximately satisfy a simple mathematical description, such as Kepler’s
laws. An initial theoretical description of some phenomena is thus not blocked by the com-
plexity of actual motions. The argumentative structure of the Principia further illustrates
that Newton approached the full complexity of actual motions piecemeal, building up from
the initial theoretical description to more complicated descriptions in what Cohen called
the “Newtonian Style” (Cohen 1980). As we shall see immediately below, this style is also
crucial for establishing the epistemological warrant of Newtonian mechanics.
Second, the Newtonian laws of motion are remote from directly observed motions. That
is, the laws of motion do not by themselves entail specific predictions about, for example,
falling bodies, but must be supplemented with assumptions regarding the forces in play to
yield predictions. Consequently, the laws are not directly “deduced from phenomena” on
the basis of successful predictions. This claim apparently runs counter to Newton’s defense
of the laws in the scholium following the Laws and Corollaries (Newton 1999, pp. 424-430).
There, Newton discussed experiments which could plausibly be taken as the basis for a
“deduction” of each of the laws from phenomena such as the ballistic pendulum (intended
to demonstrate the applicability of the third law to impacts). Newton also presented a
defense of the third law as a natural extension of the static treatment of forces to cases
where the mutually balanced forces apply to different bodies. We do not deny that the
successful treatment of these and other experiments provides evidence in favor of the laws
of motion, but we insist that this is not a case of simple predictive success. The treat-
36Many mechanical philosophers expected that such effects could not be incorporated into theories of mo-
tion; Galileo, for example, doubted whether air resistance could ever be handled theoretically. See McMullin
(1985) for a discussion of the various ways in which Galileo defended the applicability of mathematical
idealizations. Descartes similarly believed that a mathematical treatment of air resistance in free fall is
intractable, see Gabbey 1993 and Garber 2000.
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ment of pendulums, falling bodies, and simple machines all require further assumptions
regarding the forces at play.37 We take the scholium to establish quite convincingly that a
variety of phenomena are compatible with the laws of motion when the motion of bodies is
characterized dynamically using Newton’s definitions. The challenge in giving an account
of the status of the laws—and the status of Newtonian mechanics more generally—is to
clarify the sense in which indirect empirical support is accrued to the laws and with them
the dynamical conception of matter that is nonetheless stronger than that offered by mere
predictive success of hypothetical models.
We focus on Bill Harper’s and George Smith’s reconstruction of the status of the laws.
Harper analyzes Newton’s criteria of empirical success as the requirement that observed
motions provide multiple agreeing measurements of the parameters of the force law used
to describe those motions. This approach shifts the focus from the predictive success of
a single model to the stability of parameter values across a set of theoretical descriptions
of observed motions. Smith emphasizes the importance of approaching actual motions by
a series of approximations (Smith 2002b). An initial inference only establishes the ap-
proximate validity of the gravitational force law as applied to actual motions, but one can
further calculate trajectories on the assumption that the gravitational force holds exactly in
a precisely specified situation—such as two point-masses interacting solely via the gravita-
tional force. Discrepancies between this initial theoretical account and the actual motions
may indicate that some idealizing assumptions do not hold, and the next step in the se-
ries of approximations is obtained by dropping assumptions—for example, by considering
the gravitational effect of a third point-mass—and obtaining a more elaborate theoretical
description. On Smith’s account, the laws of motion (and, for our purposes, the dynam-
ical conception based on them) accrue empirical support with each success in accounting
for discrepancies between actual motions and the nth stage in a series of approximations.
These successes involve showing that the discrepancies can be handled by relaxing idealizing
assumptions in a way that is consistent with the entire mathematical framework, and in a
way that identifies further physical details of the system being studied.
Although this is far too brief a sketch of these ideas, we have said enough to contrast the
methods of inquiry associated with the dynamical and geometrical conception of matter.
Clearly, both Harper’s and Smith’s accounts of Newton’s method depend crucially on the
exactness made available by the mathematical framework of Book I. But Newton claimed to
have established “from the phenomena” not only facts about the gravity and lawful motion
of bodies, but also claims about their impenetrability and extension (see §2.2-2.3). Can
similar accounts be given for these claims?
37We thank George Smith for pressing us to clarify this point, and for helpful discussions.
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Certainly, Newton does not introduce parameters characterizing impenetrability and
show how various phenomena give agreeing measurements of them. Nor does he give con-
trolled idealizations that can be utilized as first approximations in order to derive the
properties of impenetrability and extension from observed motions, and then proceed to
develop successively more detailed approximations. The evidential warrant for such infer-
ences “from the phenomena” relies on a less sophisticated chain of reasoning than does the
evidential warrant provided for the laws of motion. We will return to this issue shortly,
when we consider a case in which a deduction from the phenomena that utilizes a precise
mathematical framework is pitted against a deduction from the phenomena that does not.
Before doing so, however, we must note a feature of Newton’s a posteriori method of
inquiry that is shared by both the sophisticated and less sophisticated types of inferences
“from the phenomena”.
Newton’s further comments to Cotes warn against overstating the certainty of any a
posteriori deductions:
... Experimental philosophy proceeds only upon Phenomena & deduces general
Propositions from them only by induction. And such is the proof of mutual
attraction. And the arguments for ye impenetrability, mobility & force of all
bodies & for the laws of motion are no better. And he that in experimental
Philosophy would except against any of these must draw his objection from some
experiment or phænomena & not from a mere Hypothesis, if the Induction be
of any force. (Newton 1977, V, Doc. 989, p. 400)
Newton acknowledged that the laws of motion were “hypothetical” in the limited sense
of being open to revision based on subsequent discoveries, but carefully delimited what
would count as a valid objection. Although Newton and Cotes continued to use the term
“hypothetical” in their correspondence, in modern terminology “provisional” or “corrigible”
would more aptly describe the status Newton ascribed to the laws. According to Newton, the
laws of motion are not provisional due to the threat of underdetermination and alternative
“hypothetical models”. Rather, they are provisional because in establishing them one must
generalize from a limited set of phenomena, and this necessarily inductive step may be
overturned by new empirical evidence. In an unsent draft of the letter to Cotes quoted
above, Newton discussed the idea at greater length:
One may suppose that God can create a penetrable body & so reject the impen-
etrability of matter. But to admitt of such Hypotheses in opposition to rational
Propositions founded upon Phænomena by Induction is to destroy all arguments
taken from Phænomena by Induction & all Principles founded upon such argu-
ments. And therefore as I regard not Hypotheses in explaining the Phenomena of
nature so I regard them not in opposition to arguments founded upon Phcænom-
ena by Induction or to Principles setled upon such arguments. In arguing for
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any Principle or Proposition from Phænomena by Induction, Hypotheses are
not to be considered. The Argument holds good till some Phænomenon can be
produced against it. This Argument holds good by the third Rule of philos-
ophizing. And if we break that Rule, we cannot affirm anyone general law of
nature: we cannot so much as affirm that all matter is impenetrable. . . .
It is not enough to object that a contrary phænomenon may happen but to
make a legitimate objection, a contrary phenomenon must be actually produced.
(Newton 1977, V, p. 398)
By the time of this exchange, however, the earlier portions of Book III of the second edition
had already been printed, so new material could not be added to them. Yet in the third
edition, Newton added a claim to much the same effect, now treated as an independent
fourth rule of philosophizing rather than a consequence of Rule III:
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction
should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any
contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either
more exact or liable to exceptions.
This rule should be followed so that arguments based on induction may not be
nullified by hypotheses (Newton 1999, p. 796).
Rule IV makes it clear that the uncertainty Newton associated with deductions from the
phenomena was quite different than that associated with mechanical models. Taking the
results of such a deduction to apply generally introduced uncertainty, the uncertainty of
any inductive generalization. Newton further acknowledged the possibility that the original
results of the deduction from phenomena may only be an approximation to further, “more
exact” theoretical descriptions. But in both cases, Newton held that the best way to handle
the associated uncertainty was to pursue comparisons of observations and their theoretical
descriptions, with the hope of turning up contrary phenomena indicating error. Pursuing
“hypotheses” in the sense of the mechanical philosophy had no part in this effort.
3.3 Gravity as an Essential Property
How did Cotes respond to Newton’s elaboration of his method? Cotes was tempted to bite
the bullet and assert that the matter of the central body actively produces the gravitational
force felt by the orbiting body, that is, that it is the physical seat of the force of gravita-
tion.38 The third law applies in this instance because the central body, rather than some
38Here we have in mind a distinction between two senses in which gravitation can be ascribed to matter
(see also McMullin 1978, pp. 59-61). First, gravity causes deviations from inertial motion in accordance
with the second law, and in this sense matter plays only a passive role, by responding to the impressed
force of gravity. But in addition, a body must also produce the impressed force felt by other bodies, and
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intermediary, is directly responsible for the force felt by the orbiting body. However, this
suggests an intimate connection between matter and gravitation, and so a question arises
about how to characterize this connection. In writing the preface to the second edition Cotes
initially called gravitation an essential property of matter—by which he meant a property
“without which no others belonging to the same substance can exist” (Newton 1977, V,
Doc 1001)—but was reprimanded by Clarke. In response, Cotes substituted “primary”
for “essential,” but still treated gravitation as on par with impenetrability, extension, and
mobility; it has, he wrote, “as fair a claim to that title” as the other properties.39
Cotes did not elaborate further in the correspondence, but it seems plausible that he
would have defended himself as follows. Inertia is taken to be essential to matter and ma-
terial bodies precisely because the laws of motion—the laws detailing the relations between
inertia, impressed force, and motion in bodies—require it. To be a body subject to the laws
of motion means to be necessarily a body with inertial properties. Likewise, gravity has
a “fair claim” to the title of an essential property because the understanding of attractive
forces at work in the Principia requires it. The Principia demonstrates that all bodies
attract one another according to a single force law, and so, taking this force law as his guide
in determining the essential properties of matter, and having no indication that this force
law could be explained by some deeper mechanism, Cotes is ready to claim that gravity is
essential to material bodies. For Cotes, physical theory itself is the guide to determining
essential properties, and physical theory is best established by the detailed apparatus of the
Principia. As promised in §2.3, we can now also see why the list of qualities generalized by
Rule III of the Regulae Philosophandi is heterogenous. The force of inertia, for example,
is essential for the Newtonian theoretical description of actual motions. But extension,
hardness, and impenetrability are not.40 Moreover, gravity and inertia are established by
the complex method outlined in the previous section, but extension, hardness, and impen-
etrability are not. As we shall see in §4, Cotes clearly recognized that the qualities treated
by Rule III are not on an equal footing and thus that not all “deductions from phenomena”
generalized by Rule III are equally meritorious.
For Newton, however, responding to the objection by taking gravity as an essential
property was a step in the wrong direction. The physical characterization of gravity as
a real rather than merely apparent force requires at least that it is a mutual interaction
satisfying the third law. This is an important constraint on the nature of the force and
this second, active sense is more problematic for Newton. For the third law to apply to an attractive force
between two bodies, without anything else mediating the interaction, each body must respond to and also
produce the force.
39See Edleston (1969), p. 158, and Newton (1999), p. 392.
40Mobility has a curious status as an object of the intension/remission criterion, so we leave it aside here.
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it runs deeper than might be expected, but Newton does not follow Cotes in taking this
to have direct implications for the ultimate cause of gravitation or the essential properties
of matter. Newton’s original reprimand of Cotes—that he applied the term “Hypothesis”
too broadly—is instructive in this regard. For Newton, the application of the third law
to the orbiting and central body is a crucial part of making the step from a mathematical
characterization of a force, as a well-defined quantity inferred from observed motions, to a
characterization of the physical causes, species, and proportions of real forces. But making
this step emphatically does not require determining the cause of gravity or the relation of
gravity to the essential properties of matter.41 The application of the third law has a “hypo-
thetical” or provisional character, in the limited sense in which the overall framework of the
laws of motion is “hypothetical”. However, this sense is not analogous to the hypothetical
character of mechanical models. The true nature of the gravitational force—i.e., whether or
not it acts immediately as a force of interaction between the orbiting and central bodies—
is a separate question, not directly related to the status of laws of motion, and Newton
reserved judgment regarding it.42 To speculate, as Cotes did, that the application of the
third law is inconsistent with the true, yet unknown, cause of gravitation is to repeat a
common mistake of the mechanical philosophers, namely to judge an experimentally estab-
lished proposition on the basis of its compatibility with claims regarding the fundamental
nature of bodies. Given his skepticism regarding such claims, Newton rejected the need for
such a compatibility check, and this was one of the most distinctive aspects of his method.
In sum, in our opinion Newton’s answers to Cotes only seem to fail to recognize the
question of whether gravity is mutual per se because Newton purposely rejected any discus-
sion of what gravity is, per se. Newton’s reference to the conspiring nature of both orbiting
and central bodies should not be taken to mean that gravitational attraction resides essen-
tially in either. Had Newton explicated his own methodological tenets with enough clarity,
41Cotes’ treatment of essential properties collapses the distinction between these two; for a general dis-
cussion of these issues, see Schliesser (2009b).
42Newton famously denied that his characterization of gravitational force implied that brute matter could
act directly at a distance; for example, his correspondence with Richard Bentley included the following,
oft-quoted vehement denial:
It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something
else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as
it must do if gravitation, in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it. And this is
one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me. That gravity should be
innate, inherent, and essential to matter so that one body may act upon another at a distance
through a vacuum without the mediation of any thing else by and through which their action
or force may be conveyed from one to another is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no
man who has in philosophical matters any competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it
(Newton 1977, III, pp. 240-244)).
See Janiak (2007) and Schliesser (2009a) for a recent contrasting interpretations of this passage.
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he could have made it clearer to Cotes that he chose to remain agnostic about the impli-
cations of his own theory regarding the essential natures of bodies. However, his lack of
explicitness on this occasion, the fact that he often entertained deeper explanations (albeit
with sufficient caveats), and the fact that he was the sole natural philosopher endorsing this
approach, all contributed to Cotes’ confusion and willingness to consider such implications.
The same pattern of misunderstanding recurs in Cotes’ query about the proportionalities
that hold between weight, inertia and quantity of matter discussed in the next section.
There, however, Cotes proves Newton to be deeply mistaken about the claims warranted
by his own natural philosophical method.
4 Proportionalities
In Proposition 6 of Book III, Newton demonstrated that:
All bodies gravitate toward each of the planets, and at a given distance from the
center of any one planet the weight of any body whatever toward that planet is
proportional to the quantity of matter which the body contains (Newton 1999,
p. 806).
It follows that the weight of a body does not depend on properties, such as form or texture,
other than its quantity of matter, as Newton noted in the first Corollary. This result distin-
guishes the force of gravity from other forces such as magnetism and also sets Newton’s view
apart from other contemporary accounts of gravitation.43 In the text of the proposition,
Newton described a pendulum experiment meant to establish that near the surface of the
Earth the weight of a body is proportional to its quantity of matter, and further that the
weight of Jupiter’s moons is proportional to their quantities of matter.44
The pendulum experiment was first mentioned in two manuscripts which follow the
initial drafts of De Motu and is remarkably simple. Newton constructed two pendulums,
each with a wooden box for the bob and equal lengths of 11 feet, and then filled the wooden
boxes with equal weights of gold, silver, lead, glass, sand, common salt, wood, water, and
wheat. For each pair of materials, he measured the periods of oscillation of the pendulums.
The connection between the periods of oscillation and the proportionality between weight
43Seventeenth century treatments of gravitation left open the possibility that gravity could depend upon
a wide variety of a body’s properties. Newton considered a long list of such possibilities in the 60s in the
Waste Book. Likewise, the analogy between gravitation and magnetism invoked by thinkers such as Kepler
and Hooke suggested that gravity may act partially, not at all, or even repulsively on some bodies, depending
upon their composition; see Westfall (1967, pp. 246-51), Koyre´ (1965), pp. 173-179, 185-187, and references
therein.
44See also Harper’s contribution to this volume for a discussion of the second part of the argument of
Proposition 6 regarding Jupiter’s moons.
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and quantity of matter depends on one of the Principia’s earlier propositions, proposition
24 of Book II. That proposition establishes the general result that the mass of a pendulum
bob is proportional to the product of its weight and the square of the pendulum’s period
of oscillation, m ∝ w · p2. (As Newton notes in Corollary 5 to the proposition, this result
holds as well with the “relative weight” (or buoyant weight) of the pendulum bob in place
of w, because for a body immersed in a medium the motive force is the relative weight.)
The proof of the proposition begins with two basic proportionalities. First, fm ∝ m4v4t ,
where fm is the motive force, v is the velocity and t the time. The first proportionality
holds that motive force measures the change in quantity of motion generated in a given
time due to an impressed force. This quantity is proportional to the product of quantity
of matter and velocity. This proportionality merely re-states the definition of motive force
as it is given in Definition 8 of the Principia. Clearly, the quantity of matter here—the
m appearing on the right hand side—represents a body’s inertial resistance to change in
motion produced by impressed force. The second proportionality used is fm ∝ w; that is,
that motive force is proportional to the weight of the pendulum bob. The proof proceeds by
replacing terms in the (slightly rearranged) expression m ∝ fm4t4v , to derive first m ∝ w4t4v ,
and then m ∝ w · p2. The body of the proof consists of showing that p2 ∝ 4t4v . For a
simple pendulum near the earth’s surface, the period depends upon both the length of
the pendulum and the acceleration due to gravity. Since Newton used two pendulums of
equal length, the periods would have differed only if the gravitational acceleration of the
bobs differed. Put differently, if the gravitational acceleration differed for pendulum bobs
composed of different materials, the difference would be reflected in the pendulums’ periods.
Newton reported that the periods of two pendulums containing different types of matter
(gold and wood, for example) were in fact the same, to within an accuracy of 11000 . From
this experiment, he concluded that:
Accordingly, the amount of the matter in the gold (by II.24, corollaries I and
VI) was to the amount of matter in the wood as the action of the motive force
upon all the gold[,] to the action of the motive force upon all the wood–that is,
as the weight of one to the weight of the other. And it was so for the rest of the
materials (Newton 1999, p. 807).
In other words, using the same notation as above, m ∝ fm ∝ w for all the materials tested
in the experiment. Newton generalized this to include all bodies, including those composed
of materials not tested in the experiment. He wrote: “This is the quality of all bodies
within reach of our experiments, and therefore (by Rule 3) is to be affirmed of all bodies
whatsoever.” The Corollaries of Proposition 6 treat the implications of this proposition for
matter theory.
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Of particular importance to us is Corollary III. In Corollary III, Newton argued that a
vacuum must exist. If a plenum existed, he argued, then all bodies would have the same
specific gravity and no body would rise or descend through air. The Corollary reads as
follows in the first edition (Newton 1999, p. 810):
And thus a vacuum is necessary. For if all spaces were full, the specific gravity of
the fluid with which the region of the air would be filled, because of the extreme
density of its matter, would not be less than the specific gravity of quicksilver
or gold or of any other body with the greatest density, and therefore neither
gold nor any other body could descend in air. For bodies do not ever descend
in fluids unless they have a greater specific gravity.
Cotes’ objected that this argument implicitly assumes that completely filled regions
of space possess identical specific gravities, which, in turn, can be the case if and only if
those regions contain identical quantities of matter. He illustrated the objection with a
thought-experiment:45
Let us suppose two globes A & B of equal magnitudes to be perfectly fill’d
with matter without any interstices of void Space; I would ask the question
whether it be impossible that God should give different vires inertia to these
Globes. I think it cannot be said that they must necessarily have the same or
an equal Vis Inertia. Now You do all along in Your Philosophy, & I think very
rightly, estimate the quantity of matter by the Vis Inertia & particularly in this
VIth Proposition in which no more is strictly proved than that the Gravitys of
all Bodys are proportionable to their Vires Inertia. Tis possible then, that ye
equal spaces possess’d by ye Globes A & B may be both perfectly fill’d with
matter, so no void interstices remain, & yet that the quantity of matter in each
space shall not be the same. Therefore when You define or assume the quantity
of Matter to be proportionable to its Vis Inertia, You must not at the same
time define or assume it to be proportionable to ye space which it may perfectly
fill without any void interstices; unless you hold it impossible for the 2 Globes
A & B to have different Vires Inertia. Now in the 3rd Corollary I think You do
in effect assume both these things at once (Newton 1977, V, Doc. 893, p. 228).
Cotes pointed out, in other words, that the two ways of quantifying matter—based on
its response to impressed force (vis inertiæ) and based on the volume it impenetrably fills—
need not agree. The third corollary presupposes that these two measures of quantity of
matter do, in fact, agree. However, if they do not, one can account for differences in specific
45Cotes’ Cambridge contemporary Robert Greene lodged essentially the same objection to Newton’s ar-
gument for the vacuum in Chapter VI of Greene (1712), albeit not nearly as perspicaciously as Cotes. It
appeared in a series of rebuttals to arguments in favor of a vacuum, one part of an overall critique of New-
tonian natural philosophy and defense of the treatment of matter as active rather than passive or inert. We
do not know what impact, if any, Greene’s published discussion of the point made here by Cotes had at the
time.
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gravity without recourse to a vacuum. The implications for Newton’s anti-Cartesian, anti-
plenum arguments are clear.46
But Cotes’ objection also has broader implications, implications that tie together the
various threads in Newton’s thought we have discussed so far. As we have seen, the geo-
metrical and dynamical definitions of “quantity of matter” both played a significant role
in Newton’s thought. Cotes’ objection shows that he recognized the possibility of measur-
ing “quantity of matter” in two distinct ways and that he saw a possible conflict between
them. Assuming that both methods are correct, i.e. that both vis insita and extension are
proportional to quantity of matter, it should follow that both are proportional to one an-
other. It turns out, however, that a proportionality between the dynamical and geometrical
quantification methods can be given neither a priori nor empirical justification. First, there
is nothing in the concepts of spatial impenetrability or force of inertia that necessitates a
determinate proportionality between the two. Second, although the pendulum experiments
are intended to prove that gravitation depends upon the quantity of matter, and not on
the form or texture of matter, as Cotes indicated to Newton, “no more is strictly proved
[in these experiments] than that the Gravities of all Bodys are proportionable to the Vires
46As with the invisible hand objection, Kant also criticized Newton on precisely this point. Proposition
XII of the pre-Critical Physical Monadology states that “The specific difference of the density of bodies,
which are able to be observed in the world, cannot be fully explained without reference to the specific
difference in the inertia of their elements.” Kant explicitly replies to Newton’s argument discussed above,
and comments that trying to explain variation in density starting with homogeneous atoms with the same
density would be to “indulge in an exaggerated passion for conjecture” (Kant 2003, p. 64). A passage from
the Critique more closely parallels Cotes’ argument (we thank Kent Baldner for bringing this passage to our
attention):
Nearly all natural philosophers (Naturleher), since they perceive a great difference in the
quantity of matter of different sorts in the same volumes (partly through the moment gravity,
or weight, partly through the moment of resistance against other, moved matter) unanimously
infer from this that this volume (extensive magnitude of appearance) must be empty in all
matter, although to be sure in different amounts. But who among these for the most part
mathematical and mechanical students of nature ever realized that their inference rested solely
on a metaphysical presupposition, which they make so much pretense of avoiding? - for they
assume that the real in space (I cannot call it here impenetrability or weight, since these are
empirical concepts), is everywhere one and the same, and can be differentiated only according
to its extensive magnitude, i.e., amount. Against this presupposition, for which they can have
no ground in experience and which is therefore merely metaphysical, I oppose a transcendental
proof, which, to be sure, will not explain the variation in the filling of space, but which still will
entirely obviate the alleged necessity of the presupposition that the difference in question cannot
be explained except by the assumption of empty spaces. . . For there we see that, although equal
spaces can be completely filled with different matters in such a way that in neither of them is
there a point in which the presence of matter is not to be encountered, nevertheless everything
real has for the same quality its degree (of resistance or of weight) which, without diminution
of the extensive magnitude or amount, can become infinitely smaller until it is transformed
into emptiness and disappears (Kant 1998, (A173/B215–A174/B216)).
Kant’s most thorough discussion of quantity of matter is in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,
although we do not have space to pursue the issue further here.
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Inertiae.”47 Whether the gravities of bodies are further proportional to their quantities of
matter depends on how one defines ‘quantity of matter’. If one defines it to be proportional
to the inertia of a body, then the experiments support the desired conclusion. But if one
defines it to be proportional to the extension a body impenetrably fills, the experiments
undermine the desired conclusion. What Cotes’ objection thus reveals, although Cotes does
not point to it directly, is that the choice of definition threatens the very validity of the
argument for Universal Gravitation. To see this, assume that the proportionality of quan-
tity of matter, defined geometrically, to vis inertiæ can vary, as in Cotes’ two globes. We
can replace vis inertiae with weight in the conclusion to Proposition 6, since the pendulum
experiments show that they are proportional at a fixed distance from the earth; thus, quan-
tity of matter geometrically defined is not proportional to weight (at a fixed distance). If
quantity of matter is defined to be proportional to quantity of extension, it further follows
that, even at a fixed distance from the Earth, the quantity of matter of a body can vary in
relation to its weight. Thus, Cotes’ objection undermines not just the third Corollary to
Proposition 6, but Proposition 6 itself, and thus a crucial step of the argument for universal
gravitation. If Newton wants to maintain that quantity of matter can be defined by either
quantity of extension or quantity of inertia, he must assume that the two are determinately
proportional, a claim for which he can offer no justification. This is precisely Cotes’ point.
In his responses, Newton attempted to rebut Cotes’ objection by claiming that matter
has inertial properties that are proportional to its quantity, that matter is impenetrable and
thus has geometrical properties, and that these two facts suffice to entail the determinate
proportionality of inertia to extension. Of course, this is still missing Cotes’ point. The point
is simply that these two facts, which Cotes does not dispute, do not entail the proportionality
of inertia to extension.48 Newton’s second response to Cotes (after Cotes reiterates his
reasoning) illustrates his misunderstanding and his continuing commitment to both the
dynamical and geometrical conceptions of matter and their a posteriori character. Newton
wrote:
I have reconsidered the third Corollary of the VIth Proposition. And for pre-
venting the cavils of those who are ready to put two or more sorts of matter you
may add these word[s] to the end of the Corollary: [1] From pendulum exper-
iments it is established that the force of inertia is proportional to the gravity
47Here a modern reader might object that Newton and Cotes are guilty of conflating inertial and grav-
itational mass. While there is truth to this (see Densmore (1996), pp. 313-330 for a detailed assessment
of the pendulum experiments taking this into account), the problem is distinct from the objection under
discussion.
48Cotes’ position shifted slightly during this exchange of letters: whereas initially he objected to the
implicit assumption of the proportionality of inertia to quantity of extension (“You must not at the same
time define ...”), he later allowed that the proportionality could be invoked as an unproved assumption. In
either case, his objection is that Newton’s explicit commitments do not entail that the proportionality holds.
36
of a body. [2] The force of inertia arises from the quantity of matter in a body
and so is proportional to its massiness [massa]. [3] A body is condensed by the
contraction of the pores in it, and when it has no more pores (because of the
impenetrability of matter) it can be condensed no more; and so in [completely]
full spaces [the force of inertia] is as the size of the space. Granted these three
principles the corollary is valid (Newton 1977, V, Doc. 898, p. 240).
Since Newton and Cotes explicitly agreed on [1], the source of their disagreement lies in
[2] and/or [3]. In [2], Newton implicitly defined quantity of matter to be proportional
to the force of inertia. Since Cotes had already written to Newton that “all along in your
Philosophy, & I think very rightly, you estimate the quantity of matter by the Vis Inertiae,”
the source of conflict must be [3]. In [3], Newton deduced from [2] and the impenetrability
of matter that the inertia of matter is proportional to the extension it solidly fills. Clearly
Newton took this to be a valid inference. According to Cotes, however, Newton’s reasoning
is circular: he implicitly assumed that the force of inertia is determinately proportional to
the extension solidly filled by matter in order to deduce that, after condensation, the force
of inertia would be determinately proportional to the extension filled by matter. As he
wrote in his subsequent response to Newton:
I am not yet satisfied as to the difficulty unless You will be pleased to add, That
it is true upon this concession, that the Primigenial particles ... have all the
same Vis Inertiae in respect to their magnitude or extension in Spatio pleno. I
call this a concession because I cannot see how it may be certainly proved either
a Priori by bare abstracted reasoning; or be inferr’d from Experiments (Newton
(1977) V, Doc. 899, p. 242).
Cotes took Newton to be putting a uniformity constraint on the fundamental, “Primigenial”
particles of matter, particles that are not directly accessible to experimental investigation.
The uniformity constraint amounts to the claim that all fundamental particles have identical
specific gravities; or, what amounts to the same thing, that their quantity of matter is
directly proportional to their extension. Newton had appealed to the uniformity constraint
from his earliest philosophical writing in the Certain Philosophical Questions, to his draft
and final revisions to Hypothesis III of the Principia’s first edition, and to, finally here, his
considered arguments against the vacuum. It is a fixture of Newton’s thought that had gone
unchallenged until this exchange with Cotes, although Newton appears to have justified the
constraint by subtly different means at different points in his career.49 At the beginning
of this exchange with Cotes, however, Newton seems to believe that the constraint could
49McGuire (1970) traces Newton’s changes of attitude towards the uniformity assumption, as well as
the assumptions’ sources in ancient atomism and its impact on Newton’s transmutation hypothesis and
inferences regarding the nature of micro-matter.
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be justified a posteriori. His initial responses make it clear that, by his own lights, the
uniformity of primigenial particles followed from observable facts regarding the extension,
impenetrability, and inertia of matter. Cotes’ objection pointed to the conflict between the
geometrical and dynamical measures of matter, both of which, according to Newton, were
derived a posteriori.
However, as we have suggested, the geometrical definition (and the conception of matter
underlying it) is derived by a different sort of a posteriori argument than the dynamical def-
inition (and the conception of matter underlying it). The geometrical definition is derived
from the claim that, as Newton puts it in Rule III and as he articulated more elaborately
in De grav, “extension is found in all sensible bodies”. This derivation is in some sense
immediate—it rests on no mathematical chain of reasoning, no process of approximation,
and no fixing of causal parameters. Within Newton’s broadly mechanical account of per-
ception, it simply follows from the our experience of any body whatsoever. The dynamical
definition, on the other hand, is a crucial part of Newton’s mathematical account of force,
developed and used to account for a variety of motions in the body of the Principia.
Ultimately, Newton backed down. In Corollary 4 to Proposition 6 of the Second Edition,
he rephrased the anti-vacuum argument in the form of a conditional, acknowledging the
assumption Cotes insisted on:
If all the solid particles of all bodies have the same density and cannot be rarefied
without pores, there must be a vacuum. I say particles have the same density
when their respective forces of inertia [or masses] are as their sizes.
That is, if the fundamental particles have a fixed ratio between inertia and volume, then a
vacuum must be granted. Yet the interchange with Cotes makes clear that Newton’s initial
inclination was to maintain that all primigenial particles are similarly extended in proportion
to their quantities of matter, despite the fact that his own pendulum experiments and the
mathematical structure in which they were embedded recommended no such steadfastness.
In fact, the dynamical conception supported by the results of the Principia is compatible
with treating matter as constituted by Boscovichian point-particles, with the quantity of
matter appearing solely as a parameter of these point-particles. The geometrical properties
of matter simply play no role in physical explanations in this schema, since such explanations
depends solely on the laws of motion and the further specification of inter-particle forces.
Newton’s initial failure to see this point reflects, on our view, a failure to clearly dis-
tinguish the distinctive a posteriori methods described above. As we saw in the treatment
of Rule III, Newton conceived of properties like extension and impenetrability as having
the same status as inertia, despite the fact that they were supported by a distinctive line
of argument that was not intertwined with the argument for universal gravitation or the
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deduction of the laws of motion from phenomena. Cotes, to his credit, was quite clear that
Newtonian mechanics does not support a geometrical conception of matter. While writing
the preface to the second edition, he pointed out the shaky status of extension to Clarke:
“I understand by Essential propertys such propertys without which no others belonging to
the same substance can exist: and I would not undertake to prove that it were impossible
for any of the other Properties of Bodies to exist without even Extension” (Newton 1977,
V, Doc. 1001). Cotes here comes face to face with the possibility that Boscovichian non-
extended point-particles can constitute bodies and that our experience of bodies—even our
experience of those qualities that seem immutable and invariably present—is no guide in
questions of essentiality. For Cotes, to repeat a point made in §3.3 regarding gravity, phys-
ical theory itself is the guide to determining essential properties. It just so happens that
within Newtonian mechanics inertia plays a central role in giving an account of observed
motions whereas extension does not. Insofar as Cotes is concerned, so much the worse for
extension.
Newton was not far behind. After Cotes’ objection pointed out the incongruity between
his two conceptions of matter, Newton came to withdraw his support from his long-held
geometrical conception of matter and the remainder of his views developed accordingly. The
change of mind for an astute and tenacious figure such as Newton is significant: Newton
did not back down in response to the invisible hand objection because he was certain of his
correctness. In response to the two globes objection, however, Newton modified his views
appropriately. In a series of draft definitions intended for Book III of the third edition
of the Principia (dated by McGuire (1966) to 1716),50 Newton explicitly addressed his
now-changed conception of body. He wrote:
Definition II Body I call everything which can be moved and touched, in which
there is resistance to tangible things, and its resistance, if it is great enough,
can be perceived (McGuire 1966, p. 115).
Lacking from this definition is any mention of the extension of bodies. The only definitional
property of body here is its inertial resistance. A far cry indeed from De grav ’s definition:
Definition 4. Body is that which fills space (Newton 2004, p. 13).51
50See McGuire (1966). McGuire sees Newton’s battles with Leibniz as the main impetus for these def-
inition. We take this essay to suggest that Newton also had independent reasons for formulating his new
definitions, ones motivates by his exchange with Cotes.
51We take the development of Newton’s views on body to show that De grav cannot be automatically
taken to reflect Newton’s mature metaphysical views. Rather, it is best taken as Newton’s relatively early
attempt to explicate the philosophical infrastructure in which his physics is embedded, but by no means the
last word. This is often an under-appreciated fact in Newtonian scholarship.
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5 Conclusion
We have stressed two main themes of Newton’s thought in this paper. The first is an
account of Newton’s empiricist method, and the two approaches he took to justifying claims
in natural philosophy. The approach exemplified by the argument for universal gravitation
in the Principia contrasts sharply with the method of the mechanical philosophers. Unlike
the mechanical philosophers, Newton did not allow for the satisfaction of intelligibility
constraints (e.g., that only contact action in comprehensible) to serve as justification, even
if partial, for a particular physical theory or model; the justificatory support for the laws
of motion and universal gravitation derives entirely from their ability to serve successfully
as a framework for describing motions. In fact, Newton took the results of such deductions
from the phenomena to be more secure than any claimed first principles regarding the
nature of matter and motion. Newton’s response to Cotes’ invisible hand objection reflected
this methodological stance: Cotes objected that Newton had inappropriately assumed that
gravitational force must be produced by the orbiting and central bodies despite his professed
agnosticism regarding the underlying cause of gravity; Newton responded by clarifying that
his characterization of gravity as a force obeying the three laws was hypothetical in the same
limited sense that the laws of motion are hypothetical—namely, all were fallible—and did
not entail further assumptions regarding the essential properties of matter or the underlying
cause of gravity. The second approach to establishing results a posteriori is exemplified by
the account of body in De grav and some of Newton’s statements in Rule III, and it involves
a much more direct argument, essentially reading off the universal properties of matter from
the general experience of bodies. It does not draw on a precise mathematical framework
like that of the Principia, and so the ways of clarifying evidential warrant in relation to the
first approach do not carry over. This leaves it much less clear how to assess the strength
of the conclusions derived from this type of reasoning, and Newton says very little to help
in fleshing out the account.
Second, there is an uncomfortable union in Newton’s thought between two competing
conceptions of matter. The geometrical conception of matter—the dominant conception at
the time—reflects Newton’s Cartesian roots and was linked to the possibility of an aether
explanation of gravitation. Although Newton decisively rejected several aspects of Cartesian
thought in De grav, he retained an account of bodies which took their geometrical prop-
erties to be fundamental. At the same time, Newton developed the distinctive dynamical
conception of matter incorporated in the Principia, which measures quantity of matter by a
body’s response to impressed forces. Newton never explicitly drew this distinction, and he
apparently treated the two quantitative measures of matter as simply different aspects of
an underlying, coherent account of matter. Cotes’ second objection brought out the tension
40
between these two conceptions; Cotes argued that Newton’s claims would not be sustained
without an explicit assumption regarding the fundamental constituents of matter, betray-
ing Newton’s professed agnosticism on such matters. Newton’s response to Cotes reflect
his failure to clearly distinguish the two approaches to a posteriori reasoning characterized
above.
References
Aiton, E. J. (1972). The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motion. New York: amel.
Alexander, H. G. (ed.) (1956). The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Cohen, I. Bernard (1980). The Newtonian Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Cohen, I. Bernard and George E. Smith (eds.) (2002). The Cambridge Companion to New-
ton. Cambridge University Press.
Densmore, Dana (1996). Newton’s Principia: The Central Argument, trans. W. Donahue.
Santa Fe: glp.
Descartes, Rene´ (1985). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham,
Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. 2 Vols. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press.
DiSalle, Robert (2002). ‘Newton’s philosophical analysis of space and time’, in Cohen and
Smith (2002). 33–56.
Dobbs, Betty Jo Teeter (1988). ‘Newton’s Rejection of the Mechanical Aether: Empirical
Difficulties and Grounding Assumptions’, in Arthur Donovan, Larry Laudan, and Rachel
Laudan (eds.), Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change. Volume 193
. Dodrecht: Kluwer. 69–83.
(1991). The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in New-
ton’s Thought. Cambridge: cup.
Edleston, Joseph (ed.) (1850 [1969]). Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton and Professor
Cotes including letters of other Eminent Men. London: Cass.
Friedman, Michael (1992). Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge, MA: hup.
Gabbey, Alan (1993). ‘Descartes’s Physics and Descartes’s Mechanics: Chicken and Egg?’,
in Stephen Voss (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Rene´ Descartes. New
York: Oxford University Press. 311–323.
41
Garber, Daniel (2000). ‘A Different Descartes: Descartes and the Programme for a Math-
ematical Physics in his Correspondence’, in Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and
John Sutton (eds.), Descartes’ Natural Philosophy. London and New York: Routledge.
113–130.
Greene, R. (1712). The principles of natural philosophy... London: University Press, for
Edm. Jeffery.
Harper, William (1990). ‘Newton’s Classic Deductions from Phenomena’, Proceedings of
the 1990 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Assocation 2: 183–196.
(2002). ‘Howard Stein on Isaac Newton: Beyond Hypotheses?’, in Mala-
ment (2002). 71–111.
Harper, William and George E. Smith (1995). ‘Newton’s New Way of Inquiry’, in Jarrett
Leplin (ed.), The Creation of Ideas in Physics: Studies for a Methodology of Theory
Construction. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 113–166.
Harrison, John R. (1978). The library of Isaac Newton. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Herivel, J. (1965). The Background to Newton’s Principia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Janiak, Andrew (2007). ‘Newton and the Reality of Force’, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 45: 127—-147.
(2008). Newton as Philosopher. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1998). Critique of pure reason, eds. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, trans.
Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(2003). Theoretical philosophy, 1755-1770, eds. D. Walford and R. Meer-
bote. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Koyre´, Alexandre (1965). Newtonian Studies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kuhn, Thomas (1970). ‘Comment on Westfall’s “Uneasily Fitful Reflections ..”’, in Palter
(1970). 105–108.
Malament, David B. (ed.) (2002). Reading Natural Philosophy: Essays in the History and
Philosophy of Science and Mathematics to Honor Howard Stein on his 70th Birthday.
Chicago: Open Court.
McGuire, J. E. (1966). ‘Body and Void and Newton’s De Mundi Systemate: Some new
sources’, Reprinted in McGuire (1995), Ch. 3. Archive for the History of Exact Sciences
3: 206–248.
42
(1967). ‘Transmutation and Immutability: Newton’s Doctrine of Physical
Qualities’, Reprinted in McGuire (1995), Ch. 7. Ambix 14: 69–95.
(1968). ‘The Origin of Newton’s Doctrine of Essential Qualities’, Reprinted
in McGuire (1995), Ch. 6. Centaurus 12: 233–260.
(1970). ‘Atoms and the ’Analogy of Nature’: Newton’s Third Rule of Phi-
losophizing’, Reprinted in McGuire (1995), Ch. 2. shps 1: 3–58.
(1994). ‘Natural Motion and its causes: Newton on the Vis insita of bodies’,
in Mary L. Gill and James G. Lennox (eds.), Self-motion: from Aristotle to Newton.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 305–329.
(1995). Tradition and Innovation: Newton’s Metaphysics of Nature. Boston:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
McGuire, J. E. and M. Tamny (1983). Certain Philosophical Questions: Newton’s Trinity
Notebook. Cambridge: cup.
McMullin, Ernan (1978). Newton on Matter and Activity. Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press.
(1985). ‘Galilean Idealization’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of
Scienc 16: 247–273.
Meli, Domenico Bertoloni (2006, 05). ‘Inherent and Centrifugal Forces in Newton’, Archive
for History of Exact Sciences 60: 319–335.
Newton, Isaac (ed.) (1959–1977). The Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton. Volume 1–7 .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Newton, Isaac (1962). Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, eds. A. R. Hall and
M. B. Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1966, Mar). Principia: Vol. II: The System of the World, trans. Florian
Cajori and Andrew Motte. University of California Press.
Newton, Isaac (ed.) (1967–1981). The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton. Volume 1–8
. Cambridge, London,: Cambridge University Press.
(1978). Isaac Newton’s Papers & Letters on Natural Philosophy and
Related Documents. 2nd edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Newton, Isaac (1999). The Principia, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: A
New Translation, trans. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman. Assisted by Julia Budenz.
Preceeded by “A Guide to Newton’s Principia” by I. B. Cohen. Berkeley, California:
University of California Press.
(2004). Isaac Newton: Philosophical Writings, ed. A. Janiak. New York,
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
43
Palter, Robert (ed.) (1970). The Annus mirabilis of Sir Isaac Newton, 1666-1966. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
Rynasiewicz, Robert (1995). ‘By Their Properties, Causes and Effccts: Newton’s Scholium
on ‘Time, Space, Place and Motion-I. The Text’, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science 26: 133–153.
Schliesser, Eric (2009a). ‘Gravity in Newton’s Treatise: a Note on Andrew Janiak’s “Newton
and the Reality of Force”’, Forthcoming in The Journal of the History of Philosophy.
(2010). ‘Without God: Gravity as a Relational Quality of Matter in New-
ton’, in D. Jalobeanu and P. Anstey (Eds.), Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion
from Descartes to Hume. Routledge.
Shapiro, Alan E. (2004). ‘Newton’s “Experimental Philosophy”’, Early Science and
Medicine 9: 185–217.
Smith, George E. (2001). ‘The Newtonian Style in Book II of the Principia’, in Jed Z.
Buchwald and I. Bernard Cohen (eds.), Isaac Newton’s Natural Philosophy. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press. 249–314.
(2002a). ‘From the Phenomenon of the Ellipse to an Inverse-Square Force:
Why Not?’, in Malament (2002). 31–70.
(2002b). ‘The Methodology of the Principia’, in Cohen and Smith (2002).
138–173.
Smith, S. R. (2007). ‘Continuous Bodies, Impenetrability, and Contact Interactions: The
View from the Applied Mathematics of Continuum Mechanics’, The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 58: 503–538.
Stein, Howard (1967). ‘Newtonian space–time’, in Palter (1970). 258–284. Reprinted in
Palter (1970), p. 285–284.
(1991). ‘From the Phenomena of Motion to the Forces of Nature: Hypothesis
or Deduction?’, PSA 1990 2: 209–22.
(2002). ‘Newton’s Metaphysics’, in Cohen and Smith (2002). 256–307.
(ms.). ‘On Metaphysics and Method in Newton’, Unpublished manuscript.
Steinle, Friedrich (1992). ‘Was ist Masse? Newtons Begriff der Materiemenge’, Philosophia
Naturalis 29: 94–117.
Truesdell, C (1968). Essays in the History of Mechanics. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Westfall, Richard (1967). ‘Hooke and the Law of Universal Gravitation: a Reappraisal of a
Reappraisal’, British Journal for the History of Science 3: 245–261.
44
(1971). Force in Newton’s Physics: The Science of Dynamics in the Sev-
enteenth Century. New York: American Elsevier.
Wilson, Curtis (1976). ‘Newton and the Eo¨tvo¨s experiment’, in Essays in Honor of Jacob
Klein. Annapolis: St. John’s College Press.
45
